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I. INTRODUCTION: HOUSTON-E-COMMERCE AND I-PROPERTY 
The technical news these days often refers to- something 
called "XML" and ''XML schemas." For example, Microsoft 
announced in the spring of 2001 that it would combine a variety 
of its services, including its MSN online service and its 
"Passport" Internet authentication service, into a combined 
"Hailstorm" initiative.1 A crucial part of this initiative was said to 
be a reliance on ''XML schemas.,,2 
For e-commerce lawyers, any new means for conducting 
business should be a matter of great interest. For the computer 
industry and for intellectual property lawyers, anything 
Microsoft announces raises questions about proprietary rights. 
For all these groups, ''XML'' and ''XML schemas" have now 
become a thing to be understood. 
Part II.A of this Article reviews several different approaches 
that courts have taken in the past to "new subject matter" cases. 
Some courts, for example, have relied heavily on a "dictionary 
definition" approach, inquiring into the meaning of various words 
in the copyright statute and their applicability to the facts at 
hand, but not explicitly inquiring into policy issues, congressional 
intent, or decisional consequences as a guide to their 
interpretation. Other courts have invoked the need for standards 
and compatibility in construing the scope of a plaintiffs copyright 
protection. A market leader-such as Lotus 1-2-3 which was at 
1. See Press Release, Microsoft Corp., Microsoft Announces "HailStorm," a New 
Set of XML Web Services Designed to Give Users Greater Control (March 19, 2001) 
(outlining the company's new technology allowing for integration of existing Web-based 
services), http://microsoft.comipresspasslfeaturesl20011marOll03-19hailstorm.asp. 
2. See id. 
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one time in the spreadsheet market-may be given a narrower 
scope of protection if the court believes that doing so will further 
a desirable standardization in the spreadsheet market. The 
familiar doctrine of "merger" is another common form of analysis 
in many subject matter cases. If a would-be new form of 
copyrightable subject matter appears to have its expression 
dictated by its underlying ideas, as was true of the accounting 
method in the famous Baker v. Selden3 case of 1879, the court 
will of course deny copyright ability. Finally, at least one court in 
a 1902 case drew almost entirely on policy concerns, even in the 
absence of statutory authority, creating an analysis that was the 
very opposite of the "dictionary definition" approach: all policy, 
no definition whatsoever.4 
Part ILB of this Article begins to set up a proposed new 
analytical framework for better addressing "new subject matter" 
cases by first disposing of several non-issues. In particular, I 
show that it is not necessary or desirable for courts to take 
account of many of the things that they have in the past, such as 
a need for standards and compatibility, in considering the 
potential copyrightability of some new subject matter. The need 
for standards, and its close cousins-the need for competition and 
the desire to avoid monopolies-are central concerns of antitrust 
law. Copyright law is unnecessarily complicated by importing 
these antitrust doctrines into the question of what should and 
should not be treated as copyrightable subject matter. Moreover, 
court discussions of competition in copyright subject matter cases 
can easily lapse into a misleading over-simplification, namely 
that "competition" is an all-or-nothing thing, whereas it is, in 
fact, a matter of degree-another reason for courts to avoid 
antitrust and competition doctrine when it is unnecessary to a 
decision in the copyright case at hand. 
Part ILC of this Article sets out the suggested new approach. 
This approach essentially asks whether the public would be 
better or worse off with creation of a copyright right. Making that 
determination requires consideration the incentive effects of 
copyright's protection, a consideration that sounds utterly 
natural for a copyright case, but one that nevertheless 
surprisingly few courts have undertaken explicitly. A 
consideration of incentives leads me to propose an analysis that 
rests on three factors: whether the application of subject matter 
protection to a new kind of work will substantially increase the 
quantity of such works; whether the new kind of work will 
3. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
4. Nat'l Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 119 F. 294 (7th Cir. 1902). 
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exhibit a potential range of variation in quality; and if so, then 
whether the potential consumers of such works would be likely to 
care about those qualitative differences. The remainder of this 
part of the Article applies the suggested approach to several past 
subject matter cases, comparing the outcome of that analysis 
with the actual outcome in each case. 
Parts III and IV try to give the general issue some focus by 
looking at a particular type of new subject matter: ''XML 
schemas." The technical literature is already full of discussions of 
these schemas, as well as of ''XML'' more generally. One can 
guess that it is only a matter of time before these technologies 
give rise to litigation, and in particular, to questions whether 
XML schemas are themselves a type of copyrightable subject 
matter. Part III of this Article therefore explains what these 
terms and technologies mean. 
Part IV first tries to answer the question whether XML 
schemas would be found copyrightable under the approaches 
traditionally used by courts (the dictionary definition approach, 
the merger approach, etc.). The rest of Part IV then applies the 
three-part analysis proposed in this Article and concludes that, 
although the analysis ultimately turns on factual findings that 
can only be made in actual litigation, it is very likely that those 
findings will support a conclusion that XML schemas are indeed 
copyrightable. 
II. COPYRIGHT AND NEW SUBJECT MATTER: 
DIFFERENT APPROACHES 
Subject matter questions have, in the past, often arisen in 
relation to a new technology. These cases tend to fall into two 
broad types, those in which the issue primarily has to do with a 
work's medium of fixation,5 and those in which the medium of 
fixation is unimportant and the issue is more whether the type of 
work is considered copyrightable.6 
5. See, e.g., Williams Elec., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 873-74 (3d Cir. 
1982) (rejecting an argument that the "attract" and "play" modes of a video game were not 
entitled to copyright protection because they allegedly failed to meet the "fixation" 
requirement of § 102(a) of the Copyright Act). Deciding that "[tjhe fixation requirement is 
met whenever the work is 'sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be ... 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated' for more than a transitory period," the Williams 
court found that the images in the videogame satisfied the "fixation" requirement, 
because "the original audiovisual features of the ... game repeat themselves, over and 
over." Id. at 874. 
6. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 754 (9th Cir. 1978) 
(holding that cartoon characters are copyrightable). 
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We tend to think of the former type as more common before 
the adoption of the 1976 Copyright Act. The 1909 Act and earlier 
versions seemed to put more focus on whether a particular 
medium of fixation was copyrightable; the subject matter of the 
Act was expressed in terms of tangible media like ''books'' or 
"prints" or "photo-engravings.,,7 The 1976 Copyright Act, still in 
force, tried to turn the focus away from the media of fixation and 
onto the notion that a copyrightable "work" is really an abstract 
thing, a thing that can be fixed in any sort of medium, whether 
"now known or later developed."g 
Today, for example, we would have no trouble in saying that 
a photograph is a work of "visual art" more or less akin to a 
painting or a drawing. To be sure, the mechanics of creating a 
photograph are quite different from those used in other two-
dimensional arts. But we would be comfortable in including an 
extensive range of mechanical technologies as all being a part of 
two-dimensional "art"-charcoal sketches, watercolors, oil 
paintings, tempera, pastels, engravings, frescos, and the like. 
"Photography" would not seem to modern-day copyright lawyers 
to be a strikingly different "art" from these, so much as it would 
seem to be an art that uses strikingly different tools in its 
creation. But in the mid-nineteenth century, when photography 
was invented,9 photography seemed very different indeed from 
the traditional media for two-dimensional representation. The 
copyright act of the day10 was likewise interpreted as being much 
more dependent on the medium of fixation than is true under 
to day's 1976 Act. ll Consequently, whether a "photograph" could 
be copyrighted was a serious issue for the court that first 
entertained such a case,12 and one that resulted in the answer 
"no"-photographs were not part of copyright's subject matter13 (a 
7. Copyright Act of1909, ch. 320, § 5, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076-77. 
8. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994 & Supp. 2000). 
9. See BARBARA LONDON & JOHN UPTON, PHOTOGRAPHY 341-42 (Priscilla 
McGeehon ed., 6th ed. 1998). 
10. Copyright Act of1831, Ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436. 
11. See, e.g., White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1908) 
(deciding that a musical composition "is not susceptible of being copied until it has been 
put in a form which others can see and read," and denying copyright protection to music 
recorded on perforated rolls). See also Trotter Hardy, The Internet and the Law: Copyright 
and "New-Use" Technologies, 23 NOVA L. REv. 657, 663-66 (1999) (reviewing the gradual 
abstraction of copyright's subject matter away from the medium of fixation during the last 
two centuries). 
12. See Wood v. Abbott, 30 F. Cas. 424 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1866) (No. 17,938). Refer to 
notes 27-38 infra and accompanying text (discussing Wood in greater detail). 
13. Wood, 30 F. Cas. at 425 (deciding that photography did not qualify as a "print" 
within the meaning of the Copyright Act of 1831, and thus was not entitled to copyright 
protection under that Act). 
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decision rendered moot by a congressional amendment adding 
"photography" to copyright's subject matter in 186514). 
In spite of the general success of the 1976 Act in generalizing 
copyright's subject matter away from particular media, courts 
deciding cases under the current Act still often face subject 
matter questions in the wake of new technological 
developments.15 The question today is not so often about media of 
fixation, however, but more commonly about whether some new 
"thing" is a proper part of the abstract category of "works of 
authorship," even if we do not care about the thing's medium of 
fixation. 
Notable cases like this in the past several decades have 
addressed questions about "input data formats,"16 "operating 
system programs" in ROM,r7 "non-literal elements" of a computer 
program,rs "menu command hierarchies ,"19 and case reporter 
"pagination.,,20 In addition, other cases less directly concerned 
with copyright's subject matter can nevertheless be viewed as 
though they were subject matter cases. Among this line of cases 
are those involving software "emulators."21 
14. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540. See CONGo GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd 
Sess. 1337 (1865) (noting the passage of the Act). 
15. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1233-42, 1248 
(3d Cir. 1986) (extending copyright protection beyond the literal code of computer 
programs, holding that it encompassed a program's "structure, sequence and 
organization"); Apple Computer Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249-54 
(3d Cir. 1983) (holding that computer programs expressed in object code or source code, 
which are embedded in a ROM chip are copyrightable, and that computer operating 
systems are not uncopyrightable per se). 
16. Synercom Tech., Inc. v. Univ. Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1011-14 (N.D. 
Tex. 1978) (deciding that input formats used with a computer program could be 
copyrightable "if the ideas they express are separable from their expression"). 
17. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1249-54 (concluding that computer operating system 
programs are not per. se precluded from copyright). 
18. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1233-41 (extending copyright protection to "non-
literal" elements of a computer program such as its structure, sequence, and 
organization). 
19. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815-18 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(holding that the "menu command hierarchy" employed in the Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet 
program constituted an "uncopyrightable method of operation"), affd by an equally 
divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996). 
20. Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 698-700 (2d Cir. 
1998) (deciding that the internal pagination of West Publishing Company's case reporters 
were not protected by West's compilation copyright). "Pagination" was not exactly a "high 
technology" question, but was interesting nonetheless. 
21. See., e.g., Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 601-08 
(9th Cir. 2000) (reversing a preliminary injunction which barred Connectix from selling 
its Virtual Game Station-a Sony PlayStation emulator-on the grounds that Connecti,,'s 
reverse-engineering of Sony's copyrighted basic input-output system (BIOS) constituted 
permissible fair use under the Copyright Act), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 871 (2000). 
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A. Rationales 
These different subject matter cases often emphasize 
different rationales for their outcomes. Among the different 
rationales-not necessarily mutually exclusive-have been 
whether: (1) the new thing is not copyrightable by definition 
because it is a "system" or "method of operation";22 (2) the 
defendant has a legitimate need to be compatible with the 
plaintiff's product23 (an argument often associated with a 
consideration of whether the plaintiff's product has established 
such a "standard" in the industry that the public benefit from 
using the standard outweighs the plaintiff's interest in 
ownership24); (3) any "expression" in the new thing is essentially 
dictated by, and hence merged with, the thing's underlying 
functional features;25 and (4) America's general policy favoring 
marketplace transactions over governmental allocation argues 
for the creation of some sort of legal property interest like that of 
copyright. 
1. Dictionary Definition Approach. Some courts try only to see 
whether the Copyright Act's definitions are met by the subject 
matter at issue.26 Certainly, the first step to take in any question of 
statutory application is to see how the categories defined in the 
statute apply to the facts at hand. I refer here, however, to the fact 
that some courts-even in what they themselves consider to be hard 
22. See, e.g., Lotus, 49 F.3d at 815 (holding a menu command hierarchy for 
computer spreadsheet program to be an uncopyrightable "method of operation"); Brief 
English Systems, Inc. v. Owen, 48 F.2d 555, 555 (2d Cir. 1931) (holding speedwriting 
system uncopyrightable). 
23. See, e.g., Lotus, 49 F.3d at 820 (Boudin, J., concurring) (approving a competitor's 
adoption of "the Lotus [spreadsheet] menu ... as a fallback option for those users already 
committed to it by prior experience"). 
24. See, e.g., id. at 821 (Boudin, J., concurring) (noting that the Lotus 1-2-3 
spreadsheet at one time "represented the de facto standard for electronic spreadsheet 
commands," but concluding that this fact did not justify keeping "customers who have 
learned the Lotus menu ... captives of Lotus" if"a better spreadsheet comes along"). 
25. See, e.g., The Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 2001 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 17389, "':15-18 (lst Cir. 2001) (holding that a scented candle manufacturer was not 
entitled to copyright protection on the subject matter of the photographs printed on its 
candle labels because of the merger doctrine); Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership 
Software, Inc., 12 F.3d 527, 533 (5th Cir. 1994) ("[WJhen an idea can be expressed in very 
few ways, copyright law does not protect that eJ..'Pression, because doing so would confer a 
de facto monopoly over the idea. In such cases idea and expression are said to be 
merged."). 
26. See, e.g., Verney Corp. v. Rose Fabric Converters Corp., 87 F. Supp. 802, 804 
(S.D.N.Y. 1949) (analyzing whether a fabric design fits into the statutory definition of 
print or label); Wood v. Abbott, 30 F. Cas. 424, 425 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1866) (No. 17,938) 
(holding that photographs did not fit within statutory list of copyrightable works because 
photographs did not exist at the time the Copyright Act of 1831 was passed). 
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cases-do not undertake any significant policy analysis or 
discussion. They rely primarily on a "literal minded" dictionary 
definition approach without much discussion of why Congress might 
have set up the definitional categories it did or what purposes it 
might have intended those categories to achieve. 
Wood u. Abbott,27 a district court case from 1866, is a good 
example. In Wood, the essential question was whether a 
"photograph" was copyrightable.28 Photography at that time was 
still quite a new technology,29 and the issue was one of first 
impression.30 The statute at that time provided that: "any 
person ... who shall ... invent, design, etch, engrave, work ... 
from his own design, any print or engraving ... shall have the 
sole right. .. of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending 
such ... print, cut, or engraving, in whole or in part, for the term 
of twenty-eight years .... ,,31 
As the court defined it, the issue was "whether or not these 
photographs are prints, cuts or engravings, and, therefore, 
protected by the statute,,,32 with a particular focus on whether 
photographs fit the statutory definition of "prints.,,33 
The analysis of this question was based on asking what 
Congress meant in the literal sense by the word "print.,,34 The 
court concluded that Congress must have meant "print" in a non-
photographic sense, because the art of photography had not been 
invented in 1831 when the then-current statute35 had been 
enacted: 
[Photography] is a new and beautiful art, discovered long 
after the statute in question was enacted. It is not a 
development of the art of making prints or engravings 
which existed at the date of the act. Then, a print was 
defined to be "a mark or form made by impression or 
printing; anything printed; that which, being impressed, 
leaves its form, as a butter print, a cut in wood or metal to 
be impressed on paper; the impression made; a picture; a 
stamp; the letters in a printed book," &c. As used in this 
statute, it was synonymous with the term "engraving," with 
27. Wood, 30 F. Cas. at 424. 
28. See id. at 424--25. 
29. See LONDON & UPTON, supra note 9, at 342 (noting that the "first public 
announcement of the invention of a successful photographic process" occurred in 1839). 
30. See Wood, 30 F. Cas. at 424 ("The case presented ... is a novel one, at least in 
this court .... "). 
31. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (1831). 
32. Wood, 30 F. Cas. at 425. 
33. [d. 
34. [d. 
35. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16,4 Stat. 436 (1831). 
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which it is connected in the act, which means, in this 
relation, "an engraved plate; an impression from an 
engraved plate." This new art of photography, and all its 
kindred processes, is an entirely original and independent 
mode of taking pictures of material objects, and multiplying 
copies of such pictures at pleasure. That combination of 
creative or imitative power and mechanical skill by which 
the artist works out his own conception, or the embodied 
conception of another, in a fixed form, the fruits of which 
the law was intended to protect, is not brought into play. No 
block, plate, or stone is engraved. No figure is drawn, 
etched, raised, or worked on any surface from which copies 
are to be produced by impression or printed.36 
863 
In short, if photography did not exist at the time Congress 
enacted the statute, then the statute could not apply to 
photography.37 And indeed, that is what the court ultimately 
held.3s 
Justice Holmes's opinion in the famous Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithographing39 case briefly invoked a dictionary 
definition approach-albeit in connection with a much more 
significant policy argument. At issue was whether a commercial 
advertising poster for a circus was copyrightable subject matter.40 
At the time, there was a strong current of thought that copyright 
law was only for the protection of "art" in the sense of "fine art" 
like painting and drawing, music, drama, and so on.41 The Court 
rejected that view, concluding that copyright was intended for 
any sort of print or drawing, whether created for pure 
intellectual contemplation or to promote sales.42 The policy 
argument rested on the Court's reluctance to have judges engage 
in the assessment of artistic quality to determine that "this" work 
36. Wood, 30 F. Cas. at 425. 
37. See id. 
38. ld. at 425 (holding that Congress could not have intended to include 
photography as copyrightable work under the Act of February 3, 1831, because 
photography had not yet been invented at the tinle of the Act's passage). In fact, Congress 
had ell:pressly added "photography" to the statute's subject matter retroactively, so the 
court itself understood the limited role its decision would have in the scheme of things. 
See id. 
39. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
40. ld. at 248. 
41. See, e.g., J.L. Mott Iron Works v. Clow, 82 F. 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1897) (refusing 
to extend copyright protection to drawings in an appliance catalogue, finding that the 
subjects of the drawings-a washbowl, sink, sponge holder, brush holder, and a robe 
hook-lacked ornamentation, and could not have been "the subject of artistic treatment"). 
42. See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251 ("A picture is ... none the less a subject of 
copyright, that it is used for an advertisement."). 
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was "fine art," but "that" work was something lesser.43 But, along 
with that policy argument, Holmes mentioned that the wording 
of the statute did not seem confined to "fine art" in any event, 
despite the statute's use of that term for another purpose.44 
One recent court asked whether the proposed new subject 
matter in issue was a "system" or "method of operation," a 
particular instance of this same "dictionary definition" 
approach.45 In section 102(b), the Copyright Act says the 
following: 
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, 
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, 
illustrated, or embodied in such work.46 
The majority's opinion in Lotus v. Borland approached the 
case in that fashion. The Lotus Corporation had developed the 
widely used spreadsheet software known as "Lotus 1-2-3," which 
is: 
[A] spreadsheet program that enables users to perform 
accounting functions electronically on a computer. Users 
manipulate and control the program via a series of menu 
commands, such as "Copy," "Print," and "Quit." Users 
choose commands either by highlighting them on the screen 
or by typing their first letter. In all, Lotus 1-2-3 has 469 
commands arranged into more than 50 menus and 
submenus.47 
A Competing software company, Borland, developed its own 
spreadsheet program, "Quattro," which could make use of the 
same menu commands-indeed, Quattro implemented "a 
43. See id. at 251-52 (stating that the practice of persons trained only in the law to 
become judges of artistic quality would be "a dangerous undertaking"). 
44. Justice Holmes stated: 
We assume that the construction of Rev. Stat. § 4952 ... allowing a copyright to 
the "author, designer, or proprietor. .. of any engraving, cut, print... [or] 
chromo" is affected by the act of 1874 .... That section provides that, "in the 
construction of this act, the words 'engraving,' 'cut,' and 'print' shall be applied 
only to pictorial illustrations or works connected with the fine arts." We see no 
reason for taking the words "connected ,vith the fine arts" as qualifying anything 
except the word "works," but it would not change our decision if we should 
assume further that they also qualified "pictorial illustrations," as the defendant 
contends. 
ld. at 250. 
45. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding 
the Lotus menu hierarchy to be an uncopyrightable method of operation). 
46. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) (emphasis added). 
47. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 809. 
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virtually identical copy of the 1-2-3 menu tree,,,48 though with a 
different on-screen appearance.49 Lotus sued Borland, arguing 
that Borland had infringed Lotus's copyright in the hierarchy of 
menu commands.50 The trial court agreed with Lotus.51 On 
appeal, the First Circuit disagreed and concluded that the menu 
hierarchy was not copyrightable.52 The case went to the Supreme 
Court, which affirmed the First Circuit on a split four-to-four 
vote, with one justice recusing himself.53 
The First Circuit's opinion therefore stands as the 
authoritative word. The court analyzed the issue by asking 
whether the hierarchy of commands was a "system" or "method of 
operation,,,54 neither of which, by the Act's own definitions, is 
subject to copyright protection.55 The court concluded that the 
hierarchy was in fact a "method of operation," and hence not 
copyrightable: 
We hold that the Lotus menu command hierarchy is an 
uncopyrightable "method of operation." The Lotus menu 
command hierarchy provides the means by which users 
control and operate Lotus 1-2-3 .... Users must use the 
command terms to tell the computer what to do. Without 
the menu command hierarchy, users would not be able to 
access and control, or indeed make use of, Lotus 1-2-3's 
functional capabilities. 
The Lotus menu command hierarchy does not merely 
explain and present Lotus 1-2-3's functional capabilities to 
the user; it also serves as the method by which the program 
is operated and controlled.56 
Having defined the menu hierarchy as a "method of operation," 
the court was then obliged to find it uncopyrightable by 
definition. 57 
48. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 202, 212 (D. Mass. 1993). 
49. [d. 
50. [d. at 209. 
51. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 809 (summarizing the ultinlate outcome of the four previous 
proceedings before the trial court). 
52. [d. at 815; refer to notes 54-57 infra and accompanying text (discussing the 
court's reasoning). 
53. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 516 U.S 223, 233 (1996). Justice Stevens 
took no part in the decision. [d. 
54. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 815-16. 
55. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original 
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery .... "). 
56. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 815. 
57. See id. at 815-16. 
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Dictionary definitions can, of course, be used flexibly. In one 
of the first cases dealing with the copyrightability of a motion 
picture, the court applied a copyright statute that had included 
"photography" as copyrightable subject matter for years, but did 
not yet mention "motion pictures.,,58 The court found that a reel of 
motion picture film was essentially a very long photograph and 
hence was copyrightable under that heading. 59 
2. Standards and Compatibility Approach. Courts finding a 
new work not copyrightable often support their conclusions by 
asserting that copyright protection would unduly hinder 
competition.60 This general statement is bolstered either by a 
reference to the need for competitors to be able to adopt widely used, 
de facto standards, or by a reference to the advantages to customers 
of using a new product that is "compatible with" previous products 
and that accordingly does not require retraining, reprogramming, or 
new data preparation techniques. 
The First Circuit pointed to these factors in support of its 
conclusion in Lotus, looking favorably on the value of users being 
able to apply their skills and familiarity with the Lotus 1-2-3 
commands to other programs like Borland's Quattro: 
That the Lotus menu command hierarchy is a "method of 
operation" becomes clearer when one considers program 
compatibility. Under Lotus's theory, if a user uses several 
different programs, he or she must learn how to perform 
the same operation in a different way for each program 
used. For example, ifthe user wanted the computer to print 
material, then the user would have to learn not just one 
method of operating the computer such that it prints, but 
many different methods. We find this absurd.61 
In a lengthy concurring opinion, Judge Boudin similarly 
referred to the role of software standards: 
58. Edison v. Lubin, 122 F. 240, 241 (3d Cir. 1903) (applying Act of March 3,1865, 
ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540 (1865». 
59. Id. at 242 ("[T]hat [the reel] is, in substance, a single photograph, is shown by 
the fact that its value consists in its protection as a whole or unit, and the injury to 
copyright protection consists not in pirating one picture, but in appropriating it in its 
entirety."). 
60. See, e.g., Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 
1464 (5th Cir. 1990) ("The ... maps consisted oflines representing the proposed location 
of the pipeline .... To extend protection to the lines would be to grant Kern River a 
monopoly of the idea for locating a proposed pipeline in the chosen corridor, a foreclosure 
of competition that Congress could not have intended to sanction through copyright 
law .... "). 
61. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 817-18 (emphasis added). 
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Apparently, for a period Lotus 1-2-3 has had such sway in 
the market that it has represented the de facto standard for 
electronic spreadsheet commands. So long as Lotus is the 
superior spreadsheet-either in quality or in price-there 
may be nothing wrong with this advantage. But if a better 
spreadsheet comes along, it is hard to see why customers 
who have learned the Lotus menu and devised macros for it 
should remain captives of Lotus because of an investment 
in learning made by the users and not by Lotus.62 
867 
A similar point was made in Synercom Technology, Inc. v. 
University Computing Company.63 In Synercom, two companies 
(among several others) competed in the market for engineering 
software to run on main-frame computers.64 The data necessary 
for the software's calculations had to be entered in the form of 
"punch cards," sometimes known as "IBM cards" for their 
original close association with that company.65 Quite a bit of data 
had to be punched onto these cards, and it all had to be put in the 
correct columns for the computer to understand which numbers 
were to indicate which type of data.66 For example, columns one 
through six might represent "width," while columns seven 
through twelve might represent ''height,'' and so on.67 
One of Synercom's competitors, plaintiff EDI, determined 
that many customers already would have key-punched a lot of 
their data into the format required by Synercom's program, and 
were necessarily familiar with key-punching new input data in 
the same format.68 So EDI produced an engineering program that 
used the same punch-card format as Synercom's program.69 
Synercom sued EDI for copyright infringement and lost.70 
In the process of concluding that the plaintiff had no 
copyright interest in its input formats, the court compared the 
input formats at issue to the "H" pattern of an automobile 
gearshift.71 With gearshift patterns, the court noted that the "use 
62. ld. at 821 (Boudin, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
63. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978). 
64. ld. at 1006. 
65. See generally EMERSON W. PuGH, BUILDING IBM: SHAPING AN INDUSTRY AND 
ITS TECHNOLOGY 48-52 (1995) (explaining IBM's development of a punch card with 
capacity for holding significantly more data than any other card). 
66. See id. 
67. I use "width," etc., as examples without in fact knowing what sorts of data were 
actually entered into the software; the software was designed to perform "structural 
analysis." 
68. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1008. 
69. ld. at 1009. 
70. ld. at 1011 (denying Synercom copyright protection for its input formats). 
71. ld. at 1013 (offering the analogy to "illuminate the idea versus expression 
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of the same pattern [by car manufacturers other than whichever 
one originally came up with the pattern] might be socially 
desirable, as it would reduce the retraining of drivers.,,72 
Somewhat in the same vein was Bender v. West/3 a 
declaratory judgment action in which the plaintiff had produced 
a CD-ROM of court opinions that included references to the 
pagination of each such case as it appeared in the defendant's 
West Reporter series.74 The court found that West did not have a 
copyright in the pagination of its Reporters, observing at one 
point that "the primary use of West's pagination in plaintiffs' 
products is to allow the user to refer to the location of a 
particular text within the West case reporters as has become 
standard practice in the legal community.,,75 Although it is 
unlikely that the standardization issue alone heavily influenced 
the court,76 it is also unlikely that the court would have 
mentioned it if it had played no role in the court's thinking. 
3. Merger Approach. Many cases of new technologies and 
copyright discuss the concept of "merger.,,77 In copyright law, ideas 
are not copyrightable, but the particular expression of an idea is.78 
For example, an "idea" in literature might be that two neighborhood 
groups or family clans are violently opposed to each other, that a 
young man from one of these groups and a young woman from the 
other fall in love, that both groups are appalled at this prospect, and 
that the groups can only become reconciled to this relationship and 
to each other upon the death of the two lovers. That idea could be 
expressed in the form of the play Romeo and Juliet, or in the 
musical West Side Story. Both plays use the same "idea," but reflect 
quite different "expressions" of that idea.79 In such a case, both plays 
controversy," which refers to the fact that Synercom's formats would be "copyrightable if 
the ideas they express are separable from their expression"). 
72. Id. (emphasis added). 
73. Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Publishing Co., 158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998). 
74. Id. at 697. 
75. Id. at 706. 
76. The court based its decision on the lack of copyrightable originality in the West 
reporters' pagination. Id. at 699 ("Because the internal pagination of West's case reporters 
does not entail even a modicum of creativity, the volume and page numbers are not 
original components of West's compilations and are not themselves protected by West's 
compilation copyright."). 
77. See, e.g., Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700,705 (2d Cir. 1991) (applying 
the merger doctrine in determining the copyrightability of baseball pitching forms); see 
also CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, 44 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(stating that the trial court was incorrect in applying the merger doctrine in a case 
concerning whether copyright protection of a book listing used car valuations prohibits 
use of data by another for a computer database). 
78. Mazerv. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954). 
79. See 1 HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAw OF COPYRIGHT § 1.02(D)(2)(a) (2000) 
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can be copyrighted (assuming that Romeo and Juliet were written 
today).80 
At times, though, the expression of an idea is almost 
identical to the underlying idea. For example, an author might 
develop the idea for a particular type of double-entry 
bookkeeping. One way in which that "idea" can be "expressed" is 
in the form of ruled lines and columns on a piece of paper-the 
same columns and lines that constitute the idea for this method 
of doing accounting. This very issue arose in the Supreme Court's 
Baker v. Selden81 case of 1879. Selden had published a book 
describing his new accounting method, and the book included 
pages of blank forms with the necessary ruled lines and 
columns.82 Baker reproduced some of the forms, although not the 
book's textual description of the accounting method.83 Selden 
sued for copyright infringement.54 
The Court was faced with either protecting Selden's 
"expression" comprising the blank forms with ruled lines, and 
thereby simultaneously protecting the underlying accounting 
idea, or denying protection to the underlying idea, and 
simultaneously denying protection to the expression.85 Given that 
choice, the Court opted for denying protection to both, rather 
than giving copyright protection to Selden's underlying idea for a 
method of accounting.86 The case is now described as 
exemplifying "merger"-the merger of underlying idea and 
expression.87 
The Synercom case mentioned earlier ultimately turned on 
the court's view that a similar "merger" had taken place with the 
subject matter at issue. The court concluded that the input 
formats were inseparable from-that is, "merged with"-any 
possible underlying idea.88 As the court put it, "[i]f sequencing 
(explaining the distinction between "idea" and "expression" in the context of copyright 
protection). 
80. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) (allowing copyright of "expressions" but not of 
"ideas"). 
81. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
82. Id. at 100. 
83. Id. at 100-01. 
84. Id. at 100. 
85. Id. at 101. 
86. See id. at 107 (''IT]he mere copyright of Selden's book did not confer upon him 
the exclusive right to make and use account-books, ruled and arranged as designated by 
him and described and illustrated in said book."). 
87. See Dale P. Olson, The Uneasy Legacy of Baker v. Selden, 43 S.D. L. REv. 604, 
604 (1998) ("Baker v. Selden remains an enduring authority for its pre-eminent role in 
arbitrating between protectable expression and unprotectable ideas in copyrighted 
works •... "). 
88. See Synercom Tech., Inc. v. Univ. Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1014 (N.D. 
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and ordering [of the data input fields] is expression, what 
separable idea is expressed?"S9 The implicit answer was "none.,,90 
The defendant in Apple v. Franklin91 similarly argued that 
the Apple computer's operating system programs had merged 
with their underlying ideas, or that the idea of producing a 
computer compatible with the Apple computer permitted only 
one type of expression.92 The Third Circuit rejected that 
argument on the grounds that the idea of "compatibility" was not 
the idea that needed to be examined for purposes of "merger.,,93 
Rather, it was the idea of performing a particular operating 
system function like reading and processing a particular 
programming language,94 for which many different expressions 
were possible. In any event, the court did consider merger as a 
doctrine of relevance to the copyright-and-new-technology case 
before it, although one of the requirements of merger was not 
satisfied by the facts at hand.95 
Another computer program case, Whelan v. Jaslow,96 helps to 
clarify the concept of merger by illustrating its opposite. At issue 
were two computer programs with the same overall purpose-
management of a dentallaboratory.97 One author sued the other 
Tex. 1978) ("Here if order and sequence is the expression, the skilled effort is not 
separable, for the form, arrangement, and combination is itselfthe intellectual conception 
involved."). 
89. Id. at 1013. 
90. The court stopped just short of e:lq)licitly reaching that finding. Instead, it said 
in one paragraph that a gear shift pattern cannot be copyrighted (even though 
descriptions or photographs of it might be), and in the very ne:ll..-t that "Synercom's 
argument that the order and sequence of data was the e:ll..llression, not the idea, has been 
rejected." Id. 
91. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983). 
92. Id. at 1252-53 (addressing defendant Franklin's argument that there were a 
"limited number of ways to arrange operating systems to enable a computer to run the 
vast body of Apple-compatible software" and holding that computer operating system 
programs written in object code and embedded on ROM are copyrightable). 
93. Id. at 1253 (noting that achieving total compatibility \vith Apple programs is a 
mere "commercial and competitive objective," not a factor for determining whether a 
merger has occurred). 
94. Id. ("The idea which may merge ,vith the expression ... is the idea which is the 
subject of the expression. The idea of one of the operating system programs is, for 
example, how to translate source code into object code. If other methods of expressing that 
idea are not foreclosed as a practical matter, then there is no merger."). 
95. Id. (analyzing the merger issue, but refusing to decide it because "the district 
court made no findings as to whether some or all of Apple's operating programs represent 
the only means of expression of the idea underlying them"). 
96. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986). 
97. Id. at 1224-25. Elaine Whelan, who later established Whelan Associates, 
developed the Dentalab program to manage Jaslow Dental Laboratory. Id. at 1225-26. 
Later, Rand Jaslow, an officer of Jaslow Dental, and others formed Dentcom to market 
their re-write of the Dentalab program. Id. at 1226-27. 
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for copyright infringement.98 The second program was not a direct 
copy of the first, but was in some sense a "re-write" of the first in 
a different computer programming language.99 The court defined 
the "idea" of the programs in a broad and general enough way, 
such that there was no question of "merger" whatsoever. "[T]he 
purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the work's idea, 
and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or function 
would be part of the expression of the idea. »100 In other words, the 
idea was "managing a dental lab," which is something that can 
obviously be expressed in a great many different ways, including 
manual procedures as well as computer programs.1Ol With that 
broad and abstract a definition of "idea," there was no question of 
any merger having taken place.lo2 
4. Policy-Oriented Approach. An intriguing case from 1902 
illustrates the application of a pure policy approach.lo3 The facts were 
quite similar to the Supreme Court's later and better known INS case.l04 
The plaintiff Western Union had initiated a kind of news service, 
distributed by means of telegraph wires.los The news was sent over the 
wires to be printed out by automatic machines known as "tickers" on 
long strips of paper.106 (Although the court does not use the term "ticker 
tape," one presumes that this technology was indeed the origin of that 
term.) These printed news tapes were available to the public in most 
places where Western Union maintained a telegraph office-which was 
nearly everywhere.l07 The defendant operated a similar news ticker 
service, but apparently saved itself the time and trouble of writing its 
own news by routinely gathering that news from Western Union's 
tickers and redistributing it to its own customers.lOS Plaintiff sued 
9B. [d. at 1227. 
99. [d. at 1226. The original program was written in EDL, while the infringing 
program was written in BASIC. [d. 
100. [d. at 1236 (emphasis in original). 
101. [d. at 1236 n.2B. 
102. [d. at 1239 (concluding that the "detailed structure of the Dentalab program is 
part ofthe e""pression, not the idea, of that program"). 
103. Nat'l Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 119 F. 294 (7th Cir. 1902). 
104. Int'l News Servo V. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (191B). International News 
Service, a news collection business and a competitor of Associated Press, copied "news from 
[Associated Press) bulletin boards and from early editions of [Associated Press] newspapers." 
[d. at 231. International News Service then sold the copied news as its own. [d. An 
injunction was issued against the "bodily taking of the words or substance of [Associated 
Press!'s news until its commercial value as news had passed away." [d. at 232. 
105. Western Union, 119 F. at 295. 
106. [d. 
107. [d. ("The appellee, the Western Union Telegraph Company, does a general 
telegraphing business, having offices in every state, village, hamlet and railroad station 
in the country, and wires connecting the same with central offices through the country."). 
lOB. [d. (noting that the National Telegraph News Company's copying of Western 
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defendant, at least for copyright infringement and perhaps also for 
common law remedies not clearly specified in the opinion.109 
The court began its analysis by observing that copyright 
protection had grown more expansive over the years: 
. . . so that it now includes books that the old guild of 
authors would have disdained; catalogues, mathematical 
tables, statistics, designs, guide-books, directories, and 
other works of similar character. Nothing, it would seem, 
evincing, in its makeup, that there has been underneath it, 
in some substantial way, the mind of a creator or 
.. t' I d d 110 ongrn.a or, IS now exc u e . 
And yet, surprisingly with such a prelude, the court continued 
to say that that copyright protection did have limits-it 
applied only to the product of authorship and did not extend to 
a plain recitation of facts such as appeared on the news ticker 
tapes in the case at hand. lll The plaintiff could not, therefore, 
maintain its action for copyright infringement.112 
Union's news was not disputed). 
109. Id. at 296. The court framed the issue as follows: 
Id. 
The general question raised by [National Telegraph News Company's] contention, 
then, is this: Is the printed tape, coming out of [Western Union's] tickers, a book or 
article within the meaning of the copyright laws of the United States, and 
especially of section 4956 (U.S. Compo St. 1901, p. 3407), and if not a book or article 
within the meaning of the copyright law, is there any remedy that will protect this 
feature of [Western Union's] business against the kind of piracy shown? 
110. Id. at 297. 
111. Id. at 297-98. 
[WJe may fix the confines at the point where authorship proper ends, and mere 
annals begin. Nor is this line easily drawn. Generally speaking, authorship implies 
that there has been put into the production something meritorious from the author's 
own mind; that the product embodies the thought of the author, as well as the 
thought of others; and would not have found existence in the form presented, but for 
the distinctive individuality of mind from which it sprang. A mere annal, on the 
contrary, is the reduction to copy of an event that others, in a like situation, would 
have observed; and its statement in the substantial form that people generally would 
have adopted. A catalogue, or a table of statistics, or business publications generally, 
may thus belong to either one or the other of these classes. If, in their makeup, there 
is evinced some peculiar mental endowment-the grasp of mind, say in a table of 
statistics, that can gather in all that is needful, the discrimination that adjusts their 
proportions-there may be authorship \vithin the meaning of the copyright grant as 
interpreted by the courts. But if, on the contrmy, such writings are a mere notation of 
the figures at which stocks or cereals have sold, or of the result of a horse race, or 
baseball game, they cannot be said to bear the impress of individuality, and fail, 
therefore, to rise to the plane of authorship. In authorship, the product has some 
likeness to the mind underneath it; in a work of mere notation, the mind is guide 
only to the fingers that make the notation. One is the product of originality; the other 
the product of opportunity. 
112. Id. at 298. The court determined the news to be "an exchange merely over \vider 
area, of ordinmy sightseeing,» and that, therefore, it was not "the fruit of intellectual 
labor, and would not, if actually copyrighted, be protected by the courts." Id. 
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Nevertheless, the court thought it obvious that without legal 
protection for its efforts, the plaintiffs business could be 
destroyed.113 On that basis, the court found as a matter of equity 
that property rights protection should extend to the plaintiffs 
news service and that the defendant should therefore be 
enjoined. ll4 In short, the court determined to provide copyright-
like protection-albeit of a very short duration115-for underlying 
policy reasons even where copyright law did not applyl116 
B. Unnecessary Issues 
Many copyright opinions mention or even rely on factors 
that either are not, strictly speaking, necessary for a decision 
about copyrightable subject matter, or are simplifications that 
could possibly be misleading. My analytical framework does not 
refer to these factors, so I feel some need to explain why I think 
that they are of less relevance than may first be imagined. 
1. The "Need to Compete." Courts in intellectual property 
cases sometimes refer to the necessity of competition. A variety of 
key phrases come to mind in this connection, such as: "the need to 
compete,,,l17 that "competitors must be free to enter the market,,,118 or 
that a company cannot "effectively compete" if it is not allowed to 
make use of some claimed form of intellectual property. 
113. Id. at 296 (recognizing the cost National Telegraph News Company would avoid 
ifit could appropriate Western Union's news lawfully). 
114. Id. at 299-301 (finding that "though the immediate thing to be acted upon by 
the injunction is not itself, alone considered property, it is enough that the act complained 
of will result, even though somewhat remotely, in injury to property"). 
115. The court affirmed the district court's grant of protection for a total of sixty 
minutes for each news item. Id. at 299, 301. After that time, the defendant was free to 
reproduce the news. Id. 
116. Id. at 300-01 ("Is the enterprise of the great news agencies. . . to be denied 
appeal to the courts ... for no other reason than that the law, fashioned hither to fit the 
relations of authors and the public, cannot be made to fit[?] ... We choose, rather, to 
make precedent-one from which is eliminated, as immaterial, the law grown up around 
authorship-and we see no better way to start this precedent ... than by affirming the 
order appealed from."). 
117. See, e.g., Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1278-79 (N.D. Ala. 
1998) ("Intel is unlawfully using its monopoly in the high-performance CPU relevant 
market to foreclose or restrain competition by Integraph in the graphic subsystem 
relevant market. Intel has already entered that market and has clearly announced plans 
to e)',"pand in that market while at the same time denying Intergraph access to the CPUs 
and technical information it needs to compete. This will unnecessarily 'handicap' or 
restrain Intergraph's ability to compete in that market."), vacated, 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. 
Cir.1999). 
118. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'!, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 821 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(questioning why Borland should not be free to attract Lotus customers if the Borland 
product is superior). 
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The trouble with these formulations is that they imply that 
"competition" (or the "ability to compete," or the "ability to 
compete effectively") is a binary quality-one is led to think that 
a company either "can" or "cannot" engage in the described 
behavior. 119 But surely "competition" is a matter of degree, 
something that falls on a continuum. It would be perfectly 
sensible to refer, for example, to the fact that some company can 
''better compete" if certain conditions are met, such as that their 
product take on some feature its competitor already possesses, or 
to note that the price of a product might be lowered by ten 
percent to provide more effective competition to a rival. Indeed, 
the fact that products are sometimes put on sale implies that 
competition must be a matter of degree; otherwise, a given price 
would either "compete" or "not compete," and there would be 
little point to temporarily lowering a price as a competitive tactic. 
Moreover, "competition" is always possible on some market 
level. Under no conceivable circumstances would a software 
company like Lotus be able to stop Borland from competing in 
the business world by selling running shoes. Because "money" is 
fungible, in some sense, all sellers of any products are competing 
for buyers' dollars. On the other hand, competition is always 
impossible on some other level. For example, Lotus could 
certainly have stopped Borland from outright duplication and 
sale of the Lotus 1-2-3 software installation disks.120 Despite what 
courts say, the question is almost never whether we want 
"competition or not." Stated that baldly, the answer must be "yes, 
of course we want competition." The questions are rather: "what 
sort of competition," ''how much of it," and "at what market 
level?" These are questions that this Article answers with its 
approach to subject matter questions based on copyright's policy 
of incentives. 
2. Standards and Compatibility. How important is it in a 
copyrightable subject matter case to take account of "standards" and 
"compatibility"? Many compfu'1ies would like to be able to have their 
products become so entrenched with the consuming public that they 
become standards. Apart from whatever penalties antitrust law 
119. One might think initially that the ability to "compete effectively" relies on the 
notion of "effectiveness," and that "effectiveness" in turn implies varying degrees of 
effectiveness and hence that competition is a matter of degree. But in fact, any reference 
to "effective competition" is functionally equivalent to a reference to "competition": if one 
cannot compete "effectively," then one cannot compete, period. No company would bother 
to enter a market in which it could "compete," but only "ineffectiuely." 
120. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 816 ("It is now well settled that the literal elements of 
computer programs, i.e., their source and object codes are the subject of copyright 
protection.") (quoting Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992». 
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might impose, should these companies pay a price for their success 
in the form of a loss of any copyrights they might have enjoyed in 
the absence of that success? 
The issue is sometimes thought to be captured in the notion 
of "timing.,,121 When a newcomer to a field first develops a work, 
as when Lotus first developed the user interface for its 
spreadsheet, the range of possible expressive choices is very 
wide. As the district court in that case observed, any number of 
different words could be used for the individual spreadsheet 
commands, and they could be arranged into menus in a huge 
variety of ways.122 The court further noted this was also true for 
the second comer, Borland, if compatibility with Lotus 1-2-3 were 
not a goal: 
A very satisfactory spreadsheet menu tree can be 
constructed using different commands and a different 
command structure from those of Lotus 1-2-3. In fact, 
Borland has constructed just such an alternate tree for use 
in Quattro Pro's native mode. Even if one holds the 
arrangement of menu commands constant, it is possible to 
generate literally millions of satisfactory menu trees by 
varying the menu commands employed.123 
But when the second comer like Borland enters the field 
with the express purpose of taking customers away from the 
field's leader like Lotus, the second comer can much more easily 
do so if it can make use of the same set of menu commands 
originated by the leader. In that light, the range of expressive 
choices open to Borland is much narrower at this later time than 
it was for Lotus at an earlier time. Similar observations could be 
made about the Synercom case.124 The second comer had 
determined to take customers away from the leading producer of 
software. At the time of that decision, doing so was far easier if 
the second comer could make use of the leading company's input 
data formats. l25 Hence, goes the argument, the range of 
121. See II PAUL GoLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, § 8.5.1.2 nn.56 & 60 (2d ed. 1998). 
122. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'!, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 203, 217-18 (D. Mass. 1992) 
(noting that using synonyms for menu command names results in many combinations of 
commands in the main menu and that, because changes in submenus "increase the 
number of possible menu hierarchies geometrically," the final number of possible menu 
hierarchies is "extremely large"), reuersed, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995). 
123. Id. at 217. 
124. Synercom Tech., Inc. v. Univ. Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 
1978). 
125. Id. at 1008-09 (recognizing that Synercom spent nearly $500,000 to train 
customers to use its software, and that ED!, the second comer, could "simply pluck the 
fruit of Synercom's labors and risks"). 
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expressive choices for those formats was far less at this later 
time. 
This characterization of the issue as one of timing, however, 
tends to obscure a crucial predicate-the decision by the second 
comer to capture customers from the leader. Rather than 
observing that a second comer who wants to take away the 
leader's customers has a limited range of expressive choices, we 
would do better to ask: to what extent should copyright law be 
interpreted to defer to a second comer's desire to take customers 
away from the leader? A second comer may, after all, enter a field 
without necessarily trying to capture existing customers from the 
leader. In the Synercom case, for example, at the time the 
second-comer decided to use the leader's formats, the market for 
engineering calculations of the sort at issue already included 
some fifteen competitors.126 Other than the defendant, none of 
these other competitors was using the same input data format 
that the leader used.127 If a market is large enough to feature 
many different customers using many different input formats (or 
user interfaces, or whatever is at issue), then denying copyright 
protection for anyone of those formats will actually reduce 
competition over those formats, as competitors will now lose an 
incentive to develop new ones. 
3. Official Standards. The standards issue also arises in a 
different, but related, copyright context. Sometimes a legislature 
will adopt a building, electrical, or other code as law.128 The code was 
written by a private organization, which claims copyright in the 
document.129 These kinds of cases do not raise questions concerning 
a new type of work of authorship and its potential copyrightability-
a building code is a garden-variety literary work that plainly can be 
original and expressive enough to be copyrighted.130 But they do 
126. Id. at 1007. 
127. Id. ("There are hundreds of programs available for structural analysis, and at 
least fifteen are competitive with [plaintiffs product] STRAN. All but [defendant] ED! 
and [plaintiff] Synercom have different input formats.") 
128. See, e.g., 63 Fed. Reg. 8454, 8454-55 (Feb. 19, 1998) (Office of Management and 
Budget Notice of Final Revision of Circular A-119) (directing federal agencies to adopt 
privately developed standards "whenever practicable and appropriate" to "eliminate ... 
the cost to the Government of developing its own standards"). 
129. See, e.g., Veeck v. Southern Bldg. Code Congo Int1 Inc., 241 F.3d 398, 403 (5th 
Cir. 2001) (finding that adoption of a model building code written by a non-profit 
organization did not invalidate the organization's copyright). 
130. Id. at 402-03 ("To establish copyright infringement, the plaintiff must prove a 
valid copyright and copying by the defendant of constituent elements of the work that are 
original. Here, there is no question that [the plaintiff] holds valid copyrights to the 
building codes and that [the defendant] copied the codes by placing them on the 
Internet."). 
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raise the question whether adoption as a standard in some sense 
"revokes" what would otherwise be copyrightable about the 
document adopted.131 The straightforward argument is that once a 
work becomes a legally enforceable document, it is the equivalent of 
a law-or is a law-and as such, it should be free of any restrictions 
on further reproduction. 
Here, though, as in the "antitrust" issues discussed 
immediately below, this analysis confuses two things: (1) the 
nature of a property right on the one hand; and (2) some other 
legal doctrine that deals with property rights on the other. To 
deny a copyright to a work otherwise clearly copyrightable, on 
the grounds that the work has become a law, misses the point: 
how does a clearly copyrightable work become a law in the first 
place? After all, most laws never exist in some prior 
copyrightable state. They are written by legislators as part of 
their governmental duties and are in the public domain from 
their very first fixation right up to the point of enactment.132 
What makes a copyrighted code turn into a law is a particular 
action by a legislature-the adoption of a pre-existing writing as 
the official policy of the legislature. In other words, we have a 
case of some governmental body taking action to turn what was 
otherwise an item of private property into a public one, for sound 
reasons of public benefit. We have a substantial extant body of 
law that deals with this fact pattern under the heading of 
"eminent domain" and the "takings" clause of the Constitution.133 
Governments have many reasons for using private property for 
public purposes; in some instances, the imposition on the 
property owner is slight enough that it is not considered a 
"taking" at all. 134 In that case, just compensation to the owner is 
131. See Bldg. Officials & Code Adm'rs Int'l, Inc. v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 
736 (1st Cir. 1980) (questioning whether "the public's essential due process right offree 
access to the law" can accommodate a non-profit organization's copyright in a model 
building code adopted by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts). 
132. See, e.g., Davidson v. Wheelock, 27 F. 61, 62 (C.C. D. Minn. 1866) (holding that 
when Minnesota awarded copyright to the publisher of statutes of Minnesota, the 
publisher acquired the exclusive right to publish the edited statutes ,vith head and 
marginal notes and references, but not the statutes themselves, which were "open to the 
world"). 
133. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V. See generally Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (ruling that when a regulation causes a diminution of "a certain 
magnitude" in existing property rights, "there must be an exercise of eminent domain and 
compensation to sustain the act"). 
134. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136-38 (1978) 
(holding that the application of a historic landmark regulation that prevented the 
development of a multistory office building above Grand Central Terminal was not a 
taking requiring compensation because, inter alia, the regulation does not interfere with 
the present use of the Terminal or with plaintiffs ability to "obtain a 'reasonable return' 
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not necessary.135 In other cases, the imposition is found to be 
substantial and is consequently considered a "taking," for which 
both due process and just compensation are necessary.13S 
In none of the takings cases, however, has a court concluded 
that if the government has a need for the use of some form of 
private property, then the property must no longer be "property" 
at all. 137 Rather, the cases start with the assumption that 
something is indeed "property," and then go on to inquire as to 
the degree and substantiality of the imposition on the owner's 
rights in the property at issue.138 Likewise, courts could do the 
same in copyright and standardization cases. If, for example, a 
building code is written by a private author and is otherwise 
sufficiently original and expressive to qualify for copyright 
protection, then those facts do not change because of any action 
by a legislative body. Indeed, the text of the Copyright Act itself 
prohibits such a change in copyright status, and arguably 
prohibits any action by a legislative body that would invalidate a 
copyright even with due process and just compensation. Section 
201(e) of the Copyright Act specifies that: 
When an individual author's ownership of a copyright, or of 
any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, has not 
previously been transferred voluntarily by that individual 
author, no action by any governmental body ... purporting 
to seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights of 
ownership with respect to the copyright, or any of the 
exclusive rights under a copyright, shall be given effect 
under this title .... 139 
on its investment"); see also Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413 ("Government hardly 
could go on if, to some extent, values incident to property could not be diminished without 
paying for every such change in the general law."). 
135. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 136-38. 
136. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (holding that the City of Tigard 
could not condition issuance of a building permit on the dedication of a bicycle path and 
greenbelt by the owner of the land without compensation when the City has made no 
"individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and 
extent to the impact of the proposed development"). 
137. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 
(1982) (holding that when the "character of the governmental action is a permanent 
physical occupation of property," a taking has occurred requiring compensation, even 
when the occupation is merely the installation of a cable on a landlord's roof for cable TV) 
(internal citation omitted). 
138. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 130, 136-37 (acknowledging "air 
rights" as property, but holding that certain restrictions on the use of those air rights did 
not constitute a taking). 
139. 17 U.S.C. § 201(e). See also I PAUL GoLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 4.4.4.1 n.55 (2d ed. 
1998) ("Section 201(e) departs from the approach of [a previous Senate bill] by 
invalidating domestic as well as foreign involuntary transfers.") (emphasis added); id. § 
4.4.4.1 ("Takings of copyright under the government's eminent domain power ... fall 
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A government can institute eminent domain proceedings-or 
the author of a code adopted by a legislature can institute a 
"reverse condemnation" law suit-to enable a proper resolution of 
whether the author retains copyright ownership, or whether that 
ownership is transferred to public hands. Together, the 
Copyright Act's section 201(e), and the takings clause along with 
its related eminent domain power, amply deal with cases in 
which the copyright ability of an officially adopted standard is at 
issue. Copyright law is needlessly complicated if these "takings" 
issues are confused with the question of what is properly a part 
of copyright's subject matter. 
4. Antitrust and Monopolies. Copyright is a form of property 
right, and property rights are essential to competition in a market 
economy. Buyers cannot compete with other buyers, or sellers with 
other sellers, if none of these parties can own something that can be 
the subject of a sale. That kind of "ownership" is what we mean by 
"property rights." But any form of property rights can be broad or 
narrow. Our legal system could be structured, for example, to grant 
a "property right" in something as broad as "the sale of any type of 
computer software." For that matter, we could create a property 
right in "the right to sell anything." Companies could bid for that 
right in, say, a government auction; the winner would have the right 
to sell ... whatever. No other company could sell anything. That 
would be a broad property right indeed. When property rights 
become this broad, we usually do not call them "property rights" at 
all, but rather say that the owner of that right has obtained a 
"monopoly." But the different terminologies are just two sides of the 
same coin. A "monopoly" is the equivalent of a "property right" that 
is so broad as to be unwise or harmful. Property rights can be 
narrow as well. One could grant property rights in shoe laces used 
on left shoes, and a separate right in laces used on right shoes. That 
would seem an unduly narrow subdivision of rights. 
The common law's response to all these things was generally 
to create fairly broad rights, and let owners subdivide them as 
they thought best. That is, of course, what property law's ''bundle 
of sticks" metaphor means. And nominally, our copyright law 
does something similar. Section 106 defines a quite broad set of 
authors' rights, which can be divided up in arbitrarily many 
smaller ways. 140 
squarely within the terms of section 201(e)."). 
140. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2001) (delineating the exclusive rights belonging to the 
owner ofa copyright); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476: 
General Scope of Copyright. The five fundamental rights that the bill gives to 
copyright owners-the exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation, publication, 
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Rights can also be aggregated. Although the Copyright Act 
allots copyright ownership to the initial author of a work, nothing 
in the Act prevents a single individual, not necessarily even an 
author, from buying one or more separate copyrights and owning 
a collection of them. Book publishers do this, for example, 
whenever they acquire more than one copyright from authors. 
How does the law prevent rights from being subdivided into 
sticks that are "too small" to be practical or wise, or from being 
aggregated into collections that are "too big" to be practical or 
wise? The short answer is that the law does not prevent the 
former at all, but it does prevent the latter under the rubric of 
antitrust law. 
Normal market forces will prevent a too small subdivision of 
rights-businesses will find it impractical to deal with ''left shoe 
laces" and "right shoe laces" as separate property rights. They 
will therefore have ample monetary incentives to aggregate these 
smaller rights as necessary to form a cost-effective larger unit. 
On the other hand, anti-trust law is designed to prevent undue 
''bigness,'' at least if it tends toward monopoly. The Sherman 
Antitrust Act since 1890 outlaws monopolization.141 An industry 
may also have dis-economies of scale that will provide an upper 
limit on ''bigness.'' 
With normal market pressures preventing a too-small 
division of property rights, and antitrust law as well as dis-
economies of scale preventing a too-large aggregation of rights, 
there is little need for a separate set of "property ownership" 
rules to accomplish the same goals. We do not design a special 
"law of shoe lace ownership" to prevent people from trying to own 
left and right laces separately. Similarly, we rely on antitrust law 
and do not design a special "law of car ownership" to prevent an 
automobile manufacturer or dealer from buying up all other 
manufacturers or dealers. In the same way, we do not need to 
design special laws of intangible copyright property ownership to 
bring about the right "size" and subdivision of copyrights. 
Copyright owners will find it uneconomical to deal in too-small or 
in too-large units, and antitrust law will help to ensure the latter 
result as well. 
[d. 
performance, and display-are stated generally in section 106 [this section]. 
These exclusive rights, which comprise the so-called "bundle of rights" that is a 
copyright, are cumulative and may overlap in some cases. Each of the five 
enumerated rights may be subdivided indefinitely and, as discussed below in 
connection with section 201 [of this title], each subdivision of an exclusive right 
may be owned and enforced separately. 
141. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1998). 
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Consequently, courts faced with questions of potentially new 
copyrightable subject matter need not be more concerned about 
potential monopoly effects than they would be in facing any 
t · f rt hi 142 ques IOn 0 prope y owners p. 
5. Antitrust Tying. In many interesting copyright cases, the 
defendant has sought in some way to achieve compatibility with 
some product or component produced by the plaintiff. In Sony v. 
Connectix,143 the defendant created an "emulator" that would be 
compatible with all of the different video game "units" (which could 
be game "cartridges," or in the case of Connectix, game CD-ROMs, or 
any other media) produced for the plaintiff Sony's PlayStation game 
console.144 Each game unit contains computer instructions that, in 
connection with a live game player's interactions, will cause a 
certain sequence of visual displays on the game console. Connectix 
sought to create an emulator that would produce precisely the same 
displays in response to precisely the same game unit instructions 
interacting with precisely the same actions of the game player. 
Lotus145 featured a defendant likewise creating a kind of "emulator" 
that would produce the same on-screen (or at least the same 
numerical) results in response to the same user actions that Lotus 1-
2-3 would produce.146 Synercom Technologies147 featured a defendant 
who created a kind of software "emulator" that would produce the 
same engineering analysis results in response to the same data 
inputs the plaintiff's software would produce.148 The defendant in 
Apple v. Franklin149 similarly sought to produce a computer that 
would process other software programs in the same way that the 
Apple computer would process them. ISO That is, the defendant sought 
142. On the advisability of adding antitrust doctrine to copyright doctrine, please 
refer to note 161 infra. 
143. Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000), 
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 871 (2000). 
144. [d. at 598. A player could use the emulator, called the Virtual Game Station, to 
play Sony PlayStation game CD's on his or her personal computer. [d. 
145. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Infl, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995). 
146. [d. at 810 (noting that Borland offered the "Lotus Emulation Interface," which 
would allow users to "see the Lotus menu commands on their screens" and "interact ,vith 
Quattro or Quattro Pro as if using Lotus 1-2-3"). 
147. Synercom Tech., Inc. v. Univ. Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 
1978). 
148. [d. at 1009. The defendant sought to "emulate" the Synercom software by 
copying the data input format so that Synercom customers would not have to reformat 
their data cards. [d. 
149. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983). 
150. [d. at 1243. The defendant, Franklin, accomplished producing an Apple 
compatible computer, in part by literally copying fourteen copyrighted Apple operating 
system programs. [d. at 1244-45. 
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to create a computer (including both software and hardware) that 
would "emulate" the Apple computer. 151 
These cases produ<:!ed different results. The defendants in 
Connectix, Lotus, and Synercom were allowed to emulate the 
plaintiffs response to data input, while the defendant in Apple 
was not.152 Clearly, the first three cases involved defendants who 
undertook a great deal of independent and original work to 
develop their software.I53 In fact, the defendants in those cases 
wrote their own underlying software "from scratch" without 
copying the plaintiffs software. I54 In contrast, in the Apple case, 
the defendant gave up that effort as too time-consuming and 
unreliable, and instead copied the Apple software outright. 155 
Very likely, the question of independent creation of the 
underlying software was influential in the various courts' 
approaches to all of these cases. But the crucial issue in these 
cases is not so much whether the software at hand is 
copyrighted,I56 but whether the plaintiff can assert some sort of 
151. "The [Franklin] ACE 100 was designed to be 'Apple compatible,' so that 
peripheral equipment and software developed for use with the Apple II computer could be 
used in conjunction with the ACE 100." Id. at 1243. 
152. Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that Connectix's copying of Sony's copyrighted PlayStation BIOS software while 
designing the Connectix Virtual Game Station emulator by reverse engineering was fair 
use when the emulator did not contain any of Sony's copyrighted material), cert. denied, 
531 U.S. 871 (2000); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (lst Cir. 
1995) (holding that "the Lotus menu command hierarchy is an uncopyrightable method of 
operation," and therefore Borland's copying of the menu command hierarchy to create the 
Lotus Emulation Interface for Borland's Quattro software was not enjoined); Synercom, 
462 F. Supp. at 1013; Apple, 714 F.2d at 1249, 1253-54 (holding that Franklin infringed 
when it incorporated virtually identical copies of fourteen Apple operating system 
programs in Franklin computers, because computer operating system programs written in 
object code and embedded on ROM are copyrightable). 
153. See Sony, 203 F.3d at 601 (noting that Connectix engineers developed the 
Virtual Game Station emulator over a six month period by various reverse engineering 
processes). The emulator software was written by Connectix and did not contain any of 
the Sony PlayStation BIOS software code. Id. at 600-01. See also Lotus, 49 F.3d at 810 
("Borland released its first Quattro program to the public in 1987, after Borland's 
engineers had labored over its development for nearly three years."); Synercom, 462 F. 
Supp. at 100~9 (stating that the defendant ED! had developed an entirely new 
structural analysis program, SACS II, and that EDI "wrote a preprocessing program that 
made SACS II wholly compatible with [Synercom's] input formats"). 
154. Refer to note 153, supra. 
155. See Apple, 714 F.2d at 1245 ("Franklin made no attempt to rewrite any of the 
programs prior to the lawsuit except for Copy.... Apple introduced evidence that 
Franklin could have rewritten programs, including the Autostart ROM program, and that 
there are in existence operating programs written by third parties which are compatible 
,vith Apple II."). 
156. The copyrightability of Apple's operating system software, permanently "etched" 
in the read-only-memory of the computer, was nominally an issue in Apple v. Franklin. 
The court in fact decided the issue quite quickly, finding it to be not an especially difficult 
question.ld. at 1249. 
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right to sell a combination of things, one of which happened to be 
software, and the other of which was something else. In effect, 
the plaintiffs sought to protect a higher level grouping: in Apple, 
it was computer-pIus-operating software, along with the 
application programs that ran on that computer; in Lotus, it was 
spreadsheet software, along with the menu of commands 
associated with it; in Connectix, it was game consoles, along with 
individual game units; and finally, in Synercom, it was 
engineering calculation software, along with a particular set of 
input data formats to be used with that software. 
This view of the "emulation" and "compatibility" cases as an 
attempt to assert rights in a combination of things has clear 
echoes of antitrust tying cases-when can a seller condition the 
sale of a processing unit on the purchase or use of the input data 
to be processed?157 Or vice-versa-when can a seller condition the 
sale of the input data units on the purchase or use of a particular 
processing unit for that input data? In commerce generally one 
sees attempts to do this sort of thing all the time in daily life: the 
instruction booklet for my vacuum cleaner at home cautions me 
to use only "authorized" bags from the same manufacturer; the 
label on my dishwasher urges me to use only a named brand of 
dishwashing powder, from a company presumably owned or 
contractually committed to the dishwasher manufacturer; the 
owner's manual for my car assures me that the use of any other 
manufacturer's parts may void my warranty; my color printer's 
instructions warn that the best output can only come from using 
the manufacturer's own brand of special paper-and heaven 
forbid that I might actually use another manufacturer's inks; and 
so on. 
If these sorts of product pairings amount to antitrust tying 
violations, then they are antitrust tying violations. If they are 
mere "suggestions" only because they are unenforceable as a 
matter of contract or warranty law, or would be antitrust 
violations if they were any stronger than that, then they are 
unenforceable or otherwise just short of unlawful. But in no 
event are these pairings issues of "personal property" law. 
Likewise, ownership of copyrighted property like computer 
software might be used to violate contrace58 or warranty law, 159 or 
157. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 463-64 
(1992) (finding that a requirement conditioning the sale of replacement parts for 
photocopiers on the purchase of service from Kodak constituting a tying arrangement); 
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 64-66 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding that 
technologically binding an Internet browser to an operating system had an anti-
competitive effect). 
158. See, e.g., Nat'l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 
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to commit an antitrust tying violation,160 but in none of these 
cases would the results tell us much about the nature of 
intellectual property rights per se. Courts can therefore ask 
whether it makes sense from a copyright law perspective to treat 
a collection of things (or a single "thing" at a higher level of 
abstraction) as a copyrightable entity, without regard to whether 
such a collection might violate some other body of law.161 
c. An Incentives-Based Analysis of New Subject Matter 
It's common to observe that a copyright prevents 
competition,162 so that copyright protection should only apply to 
those works that would not have been created without the 
existence of that incentive. If a given work would have been 
created with or without copyright, then copyright protection 
simply prevents competition in the reproduction and distribution 
of the work and keeps the price higher than it otherwise would 
have been. In a close case on an issue of copyrightability, then, 
an important factor for courts to consider is whether an incentive 
to creation is needed for the type of work at issue. 
431-32 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the argument that contract claims are pre-empted by 
copyright infringement claims). 
159. See, e.g., Christopher v. Cavallo, 662 F.2d 1082,1083 (4th Cir. 1981) (affirming 
that fraudulently representing a work as not infringing upon a copyright can constitute a 
breach of warranty of good title). 
160. See, e.g., Microsoft, 253 F.2d at 62-63 (refuting the argument that the use of a 
copyright cannot give rise to antitrust liability). 
161. Some courts have interpreted copyright law in the light of antitrust principles 
by developing a doctrine of "copyright misuse." See, e.g., Lasercomb America, Inc. v. 
Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding that a party's inclusion of 
"anticompetitive clauses in its standard licensing agreement constitute[sj misuse of 
copyright," and holding that such misuse prevented the party from suing for copyright 
infringement). Although one can question what the source of this federal common law 
power is, I do not do so here. I do think, however, that interpreting property ownership 
rules in light of antitrust doctrine is no more necessary or appropriate with the law of 
intangible property than it would be with the law of real or personal property. Second, I 
think that meshing antitrust (or other legal principles like warranty or contract) and 
copyright principles together creates a much more complex body of copyright law than 
would exist if the two remained separate. Finally, I think that neither the public nor the 
judicial system obtains any significant gain from the introduction of that greater 
complexity. Indeed, my own view is that copyright law is vastly more complex already 
than is good for us, and that on that ground alone, courts ought to be very hesitant to add 
even more complexity, such as judicially-created rules about copyright misuse, to deal 
,vith policy concerns that can amply be dealt ,vith under existing antitrust laws. 
162. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright 
in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84lIARv. L. REv. 281, 281 (1970) (stating 
that the exclusive rights produced by copyright law prevent competition in book 
publishing); Matthew P. Larvick, Questioning the Necessity of Copyright Protection for 
Software Interfaces, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 187, 199 (1994) (stating that copyright protection 
conflicts with the free market's "tenet that copying and improving" upon products leads to 
greater competition). 
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But it is naive to think only in terms of whether "an 
incentive" is "needed or not needed." Undoubtedly, some novelists 
would write novels out of a love for writing or a need for self-
expression even if novels were not copyrighted; some composers 
would compose; some programmers would program; and so forth. 
If one thinks of incentives only in terms of individuals, one might 
therefore conclude that for novelist "A," a copyright incentive is 
needed, but for novelist "B," love of writing is enough, and so on. 
One might then be tempted to craft an incentive policy by 
imagining incentives as binary-needed, or not needed. But a 
policy like copyright law that applies to hundreds of millions of 
citizens must be thought about in more statistical terms, in 
terms of aggregate effects and probabilities. A more accurate 
inquiry into the policy of incentives is therefore to ask whether 
the incentive of copyright ownership would be likely to make a 
significant difference in the total output of copyrighted works. 
Even the notion of the "output" of creative works has to be 
examined. We care about both the creation and the dissemination 
or use of works. If copyright's incentive structure brought forth 
only secret diaries that no one but the author ever read or saw, or 
wonderful computer programs that were never used, we might 
consider the policy to be a failure. We want an incentive policy, in 
short, that will make a difference. 
Finally, our thinking about incentives must acknowledge 
quality as well as quantity. Creativity-certainly in a corporate 
environment, but perhaps also for the lone author working in a 
garage-comes in degrees of investment. Once the initial decision 
is made to create something, there is often still a huge range of 
effort (money, time, priority, etc.) that can be put into the 
creation. In general, more effort will bring about a better result 
and less effort a worse one. Investment incentives can make a 
difference, in short, both to the quantity of works that are 
produced and disseminated, and also to the quality of those 
works. 
In a case like Lotus,163 this difference is crucial. If the only 
question were whether a copyright incentive would be likely to 
affect the total output of menu command hierarchies, or more 
broadly, "user interfaces," the answer would be "no." With the 
state of computer technology at the time (and still true today, 
though one hesitates to predict much beyond tomorrow), a piece 
of software like a spreadsheet must have some means for users to 
interact with it. The very fact of a company's decision to invest in 
the creation of a commercial software product-a product that is 
163. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995). 
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itself protected by a copyright in the "code" written by 
programmers-necessarily entails a decision to create the means 
for user interaction. In that sense, the copyright on the 
underlying program code is enough by itself to ensure that a 
menu command hierarchy or other user interface will also be 
created. Otherwise the program cannot be used. Moreover, even 
in the absence of copyright protection, the market will ensure 
that a user interface cannot be too poorly designed, else the 
product will not be as successful as it could be. 
Apart from any copyright protection on interfaces 
themselves, then, we can see that there are two other incentives 
that play an important role in software interface development. 
One is an incentive to create some sort of interface at all, in order 
that the underlying program can be used. 164 The second is an 
incentive to make that interface "reasonably" good, or perhaps we 
should say "good enough," or else the product will sell less well 
than it might.165 
But here is the point: if there is a range of quality in user 
interfaces beyond the "good enough" level, then an incentive 
tailored to user interfaces as such-different from the incentive 
needed to induce development of the underlying software-would 
be likely to make a significant difference. So a crucial question 
for courts facing the copyrightability of something like a user 
interface, as the Lotus court faced, is whether a significant gap 
lies between the "good enough" interface that will be produced in 
any event, and the "very good" or "excellent" interface that 
requires an additional incentive. If there is little gap, then the 
need for copyright's incentive for the interface is correspondingly 
weak. 166 If the gap is large, then the incentive of copyright 
t t·· . rt t 167 pro ec IOn IS more Impo an. 
A corollary to this point is that the relevant consumers must 
care about the range of quality differences. It is at least 
theoretically possible that a wide range of quality levels might 
exist in some sort of work, like a software user interface, but that 
consumers would not care about those differences. If that were 
164. See, e.g., id. at 815 (explaining that a menu command hierarchy was necessary 
for the software to be used at all). 
165. Refer to note 178 infra and accompanying text (noting that Microsoft researched 
software usage in order to produce a better product). See also Lotus, 49 F.3d at 809-10 
(noting that "macros" had been added in order to decrease the time required for the user 
to set up and operate the program). 
166. The benefit of promoting development of the "improved" interface must be 
weighed against the cost of decreased competition in order to determine whether the 
protection afforded by copyright law is appropriate. Larvick, supra note 162, at 206. 
167. If there is little copyright incentive, firms may be less inclined to innovate. ld. 
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true, then the application of copyright protection to higher 
quality levels would be irrelevant.16s If consumers did not care 
about quality differences, then interface authors would have no 
reason to invest in creating better quality interfaces, or in 
advertising and promoting them, whether they were 
copyrightable or not. 
Depending on the particular facts, factual findings in 
copyright cases involving some new subject matter would 
therefore be necessary to establish several things: (1) whether 
the incentive of copyright would be likely to make a significant 
difference in the output and dissemination of works of the subject 
matter at issue; (2) whether a range of different quality levels 
exists for the subject matter beyond the normal market 
incentives to make that subject matter usable and "good enough"; 
and (3) whether that range of difference is likely to matter to 
consumers. 
D. Framework Applied to Past Cases 
1. Synercom Technologies. We can apply this general 
framework to other cases as well, such as Synercom Technologies.169 
I noted earlier that denying copyright protection to the input data 
formats in that case would result in a loss of competition over the 
development of different varieties of input formats. 17o But denying 
copyright protection to a given type of subject matter will always, by 
definition, result in a loss of competition over the development of 
new varieties of that same subject matter. Yet we do not extend 
copyright to every possible subject matter, so there must be some 
offsetting values to the value of "competition." How should courts 
make the assessment in relation to input data formats particularly? 
Again, I suggest a consideration of three factors: (1) whether the 
incentive of copyright will likely make a significant difference in the 
quantity of input data formats produced and disseminated; (2) 
whether there is a range of quality offerings in input formats, a 
range extending beyond what is "good enough" to bring the overall 
168. If the copyright incentive is large, firms may be more inclined to innovate, but 
there is a risk of decreased competition. Id. 
169. Synercom Tech., Inc. v. Univ. Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 
1978). 
170. Refer to note 127 supra and accompanying text. 
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software product to market;171 and (3) whether that range of quality 
differences is likely to matter to the product's consumers.172 
If the answer to all these questions is "no," then any 
additional copyright incentive on the input formats would be 
superfluous and should not be granted.173 First, in the Synercom 
case in particular, some sort of input data format is essential for 
the underlying software product to be usable at all.174 If software 
is developed that processes data, there must be some way for the 
data to be provided as input to the process. Granting copyright 
protection to those formats does not seem likely to make much of 
a difference in the quantity of such formats produced. 
Equally important here is the quality issue. Yet, in the 
Synercom case, it seems intuitively likely that expert testimony 
would have shown a very narrow range of quality variations in 
the different input data formats. That is, one imagines that the 
different formats were roughly comparable in ease of use, 
accuracy, or whatever other indicia of quality one might come up 
with. Finally, it seems equally likely-based again on nothing 
more than intuition-that customers were not particularly 
sensitive to these differences for their own sake. 
If all of those observations were true-and "truth" here is a 
matter for factual findings in the individual case-then the 
Synercom court's conclusion that the input data formats were not 
separately copyrightable was correct. The addition of copyright 
protection would not add to the developer's incentives and was 
therefore unnecessary. In short, copyright law in a case like 
Synercom should recognize that the relevant competition is over 
the underlying software product's capabilities and features, not 
over the input data formats per se.175 As long as the second comer 
has independently written its own underlying software, it should 
be allowed to make use of the leader's input data formats 
171. Refer to notes 166--68 supra and accompanying te}..1; (describing the requirement 
that there be a significant gap between the quality of works that would be available with 
the copyright incentive and the quality of works that would be available without the 
copyright incentive). 
172. Refer to note 169 supra and accompanying text (describing the requirement that 
the consumers actually care about any gap in quality caused by a copyright incentive). 
173. Refer to note 169 supra and accompanying text. 
174. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1005 ("In using a program one must have a format 
for input so that the input of data and the instruction to the computer are compatible with 
its program."). 
175. See id. at 1008 (stating that ED! was in a position to "pluck the fruit of 
Synercom's labors and risks," as long as EDI's product was as good as or better than 
Synercom's product). 
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precisely for the purpose of trying to take customers away from 
that leader. 176 
2. Lotus v. Borland.177 The Lotus case is quite different from 
Synercom in this regard. With all due allowance for the fact that 
experts must in fact establish the point, we can guess that a set of 
four hundred and sixty-nine user commands and their arrangement 
in menus, sub-menus, sub-sub-menus, and so on, would offer a 
range of quality well beyond whatever is "good enough" to bring the 
product to market. In part, I base this intuition on personal 
experience-I often find myself frustrated in using software by not 
being able to figure out where in a menu hierarchy is located the 
command that I want to use. Sometimes this results in my pulling 
down each of the top-level menus of a software package, one at a 
time, scanning each drop-down list for the command I want. From 
that experience, I conclude that some menu arrangements might 
make more sense than others-that some arrangements would in 
particular be easier to remember than others. And in turn, that 
means that a software developer could spend less or more time and 
research on these commands and produce a worse or better product 
accordingly. 178 
All these things suggest both the likelihood that an 
additional copyright incentive would produce more effort in the 
creation of a user interface from a software developer than just 
the minimum needed to bring out a product on the market, and 
that customers of the product would care about the resulting 
quality differences. If we hypothesize that expert testimony 
would have confirmed these intuitions in the actual Lotus case, 
then the district court was right and the appellate court was 
wrong-copyright protection should have been extended to the 
user interface itself because the resulting incentives would have 
mattered to the quality of different user interfaces, customers 
would likely care about such differences, and Borland should 
accordingly have been found to be a copyright infringer. 
176. [d. at 1013 n.5 ("EDfs preparation of a FORTRAN preprocessor program from 
the descriptions contained in the manuals cannot constitute an infringing derivative use 
provided this was done ,vithout copying of the plaintiffs FORTRAN program, as it was."). 
177. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995). 
178. I also know that at least some companies do undertake research on these things: 
some years ago, I (presumably one of many people) received a request from Microsoft to 
install a special "instrumented" version of Microsoft Word. The stated purpose of this 
version of Word was to record, over a period of months, the different Word commands I 
used and their order and frequency. 
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3. Sony v. Connectix.179 Sony v. Connectix is not about user 
interfaces or copyrightable subject matter, but it can be analyzed in 
this same way. In the actual case, plaintiff Sony did not argue that 
the Connectix software emulator infringed Sony's operating system 
program in the PlayStation console. ISO The emulator was 
independently written by Connectix.l81 Sony's argument was that in 
order to develop the emulator, Connectix had to reproduce the Sony 
programs a number of times for analysis and dissection-a part of 
its reverse engineering of the console's technology.ls2 It was this 
"intermediate" copying that Sony objected to on copyright grounds.ls3 
The Ninth Circuit adhered to its own close precedent in Sega 
Enterprises v. Accolade,I84 concluding and quoting Sega that "where 
disassembly is the only way to gain access to the ideas and 
functional elements embodied in a copyrighted computer program 
and where there is a legitimate reason for seeking such access, 
disassembly is a fair use of the copyrighted work, as a matter of 
law."I85 
But it is possible to examine the case in a different light, as 
involving a subject matter issue. Sony could be said to have 
asserted copyright ownership in a higher level of abstraction 
than the console program code. It sought, in effect, to assert a 
copyright in "the technology needed to respond to the 
combination of game unit and player inputs in a specified way," 
namely, the way that the PlayStation console responded. ls6 If it 
could copyright that "response technology," then Connectix would 
be an infringer, for it reproduced precisely (or nearly so) that 
same response technology, albeit by using different software.IS7 
Sony already has an incentive to make (or to license others 
to make) good individual games, as each such game is a clearly 
179. Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000), 
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 871 (2000). 
180. [d. at 598 ("The [Connectix product) Virtual Game Station does not contain any 
of Sony's copyrighted material."). 
181. [d. 
182. [d. at 601 (detailing the reverse engineering performed by Connectbc). 
183. [d. at 598 ("Connectix repeatedly copied Sony's copyrighted BIOS during a 
process of ' reverse engineering' ... Sony claimed infringement .... "). 
184. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating 
that Sega's video game console was reverse engineered to enable the defendant to create 
its own game units that would be compatible ,vith the Sega console). 
185. Sony, 203 F.3d at 602 (quoting Sega, 977 F.2d at 1527-28 (emphasis added by 
the Sony court». 
186. [d. at 598. 
187. [d. at 599 ("[A) consumer can load [Connectix) Virtual Game Station software 
onto a computer, load a [Sony) PlayStation Game into the computer's CD-ROM drive, and 
play the PlayStation game."). 
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copyrightable computer program/S8 and the benefits of making 
better game programs will inure directly to Sony in the form of 
greater sales of the game units. Sony likewise has an incentive to 
make some sort of "response technology" at all, as that 
technology is necessary to be able to establish the game playing 
market.189 So the PlayStation "response technology" is in many 
ways similar to the "user interface" of Lotus because once the 
decision is made to produce and sell game units (or spreadsheet 
software in Lotus), there is also a built-in incentive to produce 
and sell the necessary response technology (or the user interface 
of menu commands in Lotus).19o As was true in Lotus, in 
Connectix normal market forces will ensure that the response 
technology be "good enough," or else it will sell less well than it 
otherwise might.191 
So once again, we must focus on the quality issue: whether 
there is a range of different quality levels in the response 
technologies, beyond what is "good enough" to sell the underlying 
console and games in the first place, and whether customers care 
about any such different quality levels.192 
Again, factual findings would be called for in an actual case, 
because the answers to these questions turn on the facts of the 
technologies and markets at issue. But we can indulge in 
speculation. Mine is that a game response technology probably 
has to be "pretty darned good" in order to be good enough to bring 
it to market at all. Those who enjoy games of this sort seem to be 
demanding and critical. 193 Responses must be quite quick: most of 
188. See, e.g., Computer Mgmt. Assistance Corp. v. Robert F. DeCastro, Inc., 220 
F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 2000) ("Computer programs are entitled to copyright protection."); 
Sony, 203 F.3d at 602 (stating that the object code of a computer program can be 
copyrighted as expression under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a»; Fonar Corp. v. Domenick, 105 F.3d 
99, 104 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that source and object codes of computer programs are 
subject to copyright protection); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 
F.2d 1240, 1247-48 (3d Cir. 1983) (explaining that the 1980 amendments to the copyright 
code clearly indicate that computer programs are copyrightable). 
189. I am assuming that it would not be feasible to produce the game units first and 
then wait around until someone reverse engineered them to develop game consoles. That 
is, I am assuming that Connectix would not initially develop a "console" emulator unless 
the market was already pretty far along based on a console produced first by Sony. 
190. Compare Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(stating that without the menu command hierarchy, users would not be able to make use 
of Lotus's software), with Sony, 203 F.3d at 598 (stating that Sony PlayStation console 
was the device marketed by Sony to pennit consumers to play Sony PlayStation games). 
191. Refer to note 166 supra and accompanying text (explaining that if a product is 
not "good enough," it ,vill fail to reach its full sales potential). 
192. Refer to notes 167-69 supra and accompanying teJo.:t (explaining the 
requirements that a significant gap in possible quality must exist and that consumers 
must care about the gap). 
193. Most of my speculation on these points is based on casual reading of a variety of 
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the PlayStation and similar games are intended to operate in 
"real time," with human or exotic creatures running, climbing, 
jumping, and so on, with at least as much speed as they would 
exhibit were they "real." Moreover, faster response technologies 
would enable even faster or more realistic games to be developed, 
which would in turn cause the consoles to sell in greater 
volume.194 Both of those desirable qualities-playing existing 
games fast enough, and offering the ability to play even more 
complex games fast enough in the future as those games are 
developed-seem to me to have ample sales incentives without 
the need for additional copyright protection either on "the 
technology needed to respond to game and player inputs in a 
specified way." 
Conceivably, an expert witness could show the contrary: that 
a range of quality levels does exist in "the technology needed to 
respond to game and player inputs in a specified way" and that 
customers care about those quality levels. But, to the extent that 
expert testimony supported my speculations about the video 
game market,195 the Ninth Circuit's conclusion in Connectix that 
Sony had no right to prevent Connectix from marketing a 
PlayStation emulator was in fact the proper one.196 
4. Bender v. West.197 Bender v. West is a delightful case 
because the essential subject matter question, dealing with printed 
page layouts and pagination, has so little to do with modern 
technology.19B Still, it was modern technology that brought the issue 
to the point of litigation. The development of low-cost CD-ROM 
production (not to mention the general computerization of court 
opinions, word processing, etc.) enabled the challenger HyperLaw to 
enter the business of computerized court opinion sales. 199 The 
computer industry magazines over a period of years. Those readers who have children 
who are "garners" (or are garners themselves) can verifY my findings independently. 
194. Refer to note 166 supra and accompanying text (noting that an inferior interface 
will not sell as well as a superior interface). 
195. Refer to note 194 supra and accompanying text (speculating that faster response 
technologies provide sufficient sales incentive ,vithout the need for additional copyright 
protection). 
196. Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 609-10 (9th Cir. 
2000) (denying Sony's request for injunctive relief to prevent Connectix from marketing 
their Virtual Garne Station), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 871 (2000). 
197. Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Pub'g, 158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998). 
198. ld. at 695 (noting that the suit arose due to plaintiff Matthew Bender's desire 
for a declaratory judgment tllat its insertion-into its own "compilations of judicial 
opinions" stored on CD-ROMs-of citations to corresponding pages in "West's printed 
version of the opinion," did not infringe West's copyrights). 
199. ld. at 697 nA (highlighting greater efficiency of CD-ROM publications when 
compared to books). 
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century-old print medium of the West company had created a de 
facto-and for many jurisdictions, the de jure-standard for case 
citation.20o Much as Connectix produced something that was 
compatible with a widely used standard-the PlayStation game 
units201_and Borland produced something compatible with a widely 
used standard-the Lotus 1-2-3 menu tree202_and Franklin 
produced something compatible with a widely used standard-Apple 
application programs203_so Bender and HyperLaw had produced 
something compatible with the widely-used West page citation 
standard.204 
I have already suggested that official adoption of a 
copyrighted work into law calls for the application of "takings" 
jurisprudence and the law of eminent domain.205 Bender offers 
another example of the phenomenon of public adoption into law 
of a privately-created work (at least in those jurisdictions that 
required West page citations),206 although not as obviously so as 
the cases involving building codes and the like. But the predicate 
to the application of takings jurisprudence is that a property 
owner actually own property.207 To be sure, courts would simplify 
their analysis and the law by not considering takings questions 
in the determination of whether a valid copyright exists in the 
subject matter in issue. But they must still engage in that initial 
determination. How would that determination be made for the 
West Reporter pagination with the approach I propose in this 
Article? 
A threshold question is what the particular subject matter is 
that we should analyze. The narrowest view of that subject 
matter-in my experience, the one most commonly asserted in 
200. Id. at 696. 
201. Sony, 203 F.3d at 598. 
202. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 810 (lst Cir. 1995). 
203. Apple Computer Corp. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1242-43 (3d 
Cir.1983). 
204. Bender, 158 F.3d at 697-98 (noting that "Bender intends to insert ... a parallel 
citation ... to the West case reporter at the beginning of the opinion and a citation to the 
successive West page numbers at the points in the opinion where page breaks occur in the 
West volume" and that "Hyperlaw includes parallel citations to West's case reporters for 
all cases appearing in [two of West's reporters], and intends to add star pagination as 
well"). 
205. Refer to note 133 supra and accompanying text (explaining that a large body of 
law-the law of eminent domain and the "Takings" clause of the Constitution-already 
exists for the same fact pattern as copyright). 
206. Bender, 158 F.3d at 696 ("One citation guide recommends-and some courts 
require-citation to the West version of federal appellate and trial court decisions and 
New York State court decisions."). 
207. Refer to note 138 supra and accompanying text (stating that takings cases 
always start with the assumption that the subject is property). 
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informal discussions of the case-was that it was "page 
numbers.,,208 West's primary argument, however, was that 
copyright protection was appropriate at a higher level of 
abstraction, namely that of the sequence and arrangement of 
cases in its Reporter volumes.209 In the actual case, the Second 
Circuit seemed to accept, at least for purposes of its decision, that 
West's overall sequence and arrangement was in fact 
copyrightable.210 The case turned instead on an issue of 
infringement: had HyperLaw "copied" the West arrangement by 
introducing star pagination into its cases?211 
Infringement and subject matter questions are often just the 
flip sides of the same coin, however.212 A very narrow definition of 
"subject matter" will inevitably result in a finding of few 
infringements;213 a very broad definition of "subject matter" will 
result in many more. We can therefore usefully analyze the 
Bender facts as a subject matter question, but we must define 
that subject matter in terms of something that HyperLaw 
actually did "take" from West. If what HyperLaw did take was 
copyrightable under the approach of this Article, then this Article 
implies that HyperLaw was an infringer and the Second Circuit 
was wrong (and vice-versa).214 
If we accept the court's finding that HyperLaw did not take 
West's sequence and arrangement,215 then we should look 
elsewhere for what was taken. The most likely subject matter is 
either the very thing so often asserted informally-West's "page 
numbers"-or perhaps the slightly higher level of abstraction of 
"pagination," which implies a bit more than just "numbers" as 
the subject matter of interest but a bit less than "sequence and 
arrangement."216 
208. Cf. Bender, 158 F.3d at 699 ("At issue here are references to West's volume and 
page numbers .... "). 
209. Id. at 700 & n.ll. 
210. Id. at 700 n.ll ("[W]e can assume without deciding that West's case reporters 
contain an original and copyrightable arrangement."). 
211. Id. at 701-02. 
212. Refer to note 26 supra and accompanying text (noting that courts deciding 
copyright cases still often face subject matter questions). 
213. Refer to notes 28-33 supra and accompanying text (discussing Wood, in which 
the application of a narrow dictionary definition of the word "prints" led to the conclusion 
that photographs were not copyrightable). 
214. Refer to notes 171-72 supra and accompanying te:l..i; (listing the factors 
necessary for copyright infringement under the approach taken by this Article). 
215. Bender, 158 F.3d at 702 ("IT]he sequence of cases [in Bender's and HyperLaw's 
CD-ROM discs] owes nothing to West's arrangement."). 
216. Id. at 695 & n.1 (describing the "star pagination" used by Bender and HyperLaw 
to embed citations). 
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Question number one under this Article's approach is thus 
whether the incentive of copyright protection would be likely to 
make a significant difference in the total output of page numbers 
or pagination, or in their dissemination to potential users of 
those numbers or pagination. Expert testimony might prove 
otherwise, but certainly one's very strong instinct is to conclude 
"no." Page numbers may be thought of as analogous to the user 
interface of a software package. If a business is going to produce 
a book (or a software package), it will almost always have to 
number the pages (supply a user interface) for the book to be 
useful. Perhaps the necessity with page numbers is slightly less 
than it is with a user interface, for a book can be read without 
page numbers, but the utility of numbering is so great that it 
seems likely that a copyright on page numbers would not make a 
significant difference to the total output of those numbers. 
Looking at the issue in terms of the slightly more abstract 
level of "pagination" surprisingly makes the case for copyright 
protection even weaker. Although a book can be printed and read 
without page numbers, it is not a ''book'' (at least not in the usual 
sense) if it lacks "pagination" of some sort. To be sure, many 
electronic documents can appear as "scrolls" without particular 
page breaks, but then presumably the owner of such a work 
would not attempt to claim a copyright in "pagination" in the 
first place. We can conclude that it is unlikely that a copyright on 
"pagination" would result in a significantly greater total output 
of "pagination" than would be made available to the public 
otherwise.217 
The second question is whether there exists a range of 
quality levels in page numbers or pagination, a range of quality 
levels that the relevant consumers would be likely to care about. 
This question is actually slightly more difficult than the previous 
one, at least in regard to "pagination." I would guess that there is 
little or no range of quality in "page numbers." Not that there are 
no choices to be made-a publisher must decide whether to have 
more than one set of numbers, for example. Perhaps some 
introductory pages should start at Roman numeral "one," and the 
main text restart at "one"; perhaps an index should restart at 
"one" again; or perhaps there should be only a single sequence 
throughout. But the existence of "some choices" is not the same 
thing as the existence of a significant range of quality levels in 
these choices beyond what would be called for as "good enough" to 
217. Refer to note 165 supra and accompanying text (stating the proposition that if 
an interface is necessary to use the product, an adequate interface will be designed even 
in the absence of copyright protection). 
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bring the underlying book to market.218 And I very much doubt-
though again, expert testimony could always establish the 
contrary-that readers care significantly about these choices in 
page numbers. 
"Pagination" seems to offer a stronger argument when we 
concentrate on quality levels as opposed to quantities. Books 
come in a variety of physical sizes, with different margins, type 
faces, "leading" (spacing between lines), and so on. There seems 
to be a considerably greater range of choices in these things, 
which are intimately related to a book's "pagination," than exists 
with "page numbers" per se. An expert might testify that 
"pagination" in this sense has different quality levels-some 
types of pagination might be easier to read, or more aesthetically 
pleasing, and so on. An expert might also be able to say that 
these quality differences matter to readers as well, for perhaps 
whether a book has "many small pages," "few large pages," 
"generous spacing," or "large type face" affects readers 
differently. 
But the danger of this analysis is that it tends to muddy up 
what the subject matter in question really is. Do we mean by 
"pagination" actual physical page size? Do we also mean "type 
face"? Do we mean "margins"? Fortunately, if we bring the 
analysis back to the facts of the Bender case, we can anchor the 
discussion much more easily. In Bender, none of those things was 
"taken." At most, "pagination" on the Bender facts means 
something like "the choice of page breaks alone," as presumably a 
CD-ROM would not incorporate West's type faces, page sizes, 
etc., as such.219 So we really only need to ask: (1) whether there is 
a range of different quality levels in "the choice of page breaks 
alone" beyond whatever would be good enough to bring the 
underlying product (a collection of cases) to market; and (2) 
whether consumers would be likely to care about those different 
quality levels.220 Viewed in this light, the answer continues to 
appear to be "no," with appropriate allowances for the fact that 
expert testimony must establish this fact in any given case. 
In the end, analyzing Bender as a subject matter case, 
focusing on what was actually taken as the appropriate subject 
218. Refer to notes 167-69 supra and accompanying text (discussing the gap between 
an interface that is "good enough" and one that is "very good" or "excellent"). 
219. See Bender, 158 F.3d at 705 n.20 (explaining that Bender's product displays the 
cases in one column with no page breaks and with endnotes, but West's reporters display 
cases in two columns and with endnotes). 
220. Refer to notes 167-69 supra and accompanying text (discussing the 
requirements that a gap in possible quality must exist and that consumers must care 
about the gap). 
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matter, leads us to the conclusion that the case was correctly 
decided on copyright grounds.221 
III. WHAT IS XML? 
A major purpose of this Article is to apply its proposed 
approach for analyzing new subject matter cases to a new form of 
potentially copyrightable work to see what the approach would 
predict. I have chosen ''XML schemas" as that example. The 
following section explains both "XML" and ''XML schemas" for 
readers not familiar with those concepts. A good awareness of 
both concepts is essential to an understanding of the subsequent 
legal analysis. After this section, Part IV will sketch out how 
prior courts might approach the question of schema 
copyrightability, and then try to answer the same question with 
the approach outlined in this Article. Readers who already know 
what ''XML'' and "XML schemas" are can safely skip this section 
and proceed directly to Part IV-Are XML Schemas 
Copyrightable? Others are encouraged to read on. 
About thirty years ago, the IBM corporation hired a lawyer 
named Charles Goldfarb to become a computer programmer.222 
IBM assigned him to work on, among other things, typesetting 
and word processing with computers.223 Word processing 
technology of the day (and even today) primarily identified only 
one thing for documents in a computer readable medium: the 
format for printing the document.224 Typical word processors 
contained special codes to indicate what parts of the document 
should be in bold face, what parts in large type sizes, how big the 
margins should be, and so on.225 What word processors could not 
do was indicate, for example, what parts of a document were the 
"introduction" or even what parts indicated the author of the 
document. If a document were a court opinion in a word 
processing format, for example, nothing in the word processing 
technology could unambiguously indicate that "this paragraph is 
a citation," while "that paragraph is a holding," or that "this 
sentence indicates procedural history," while "that one indicates 
the attorneys' names." 
221. It is possible that West had a better case under some other body oflaw, such as 
unfair competition; I do not analyze such possibilities here. The court of appeals held that 
Bender and HyperLaw would not infringe on West's copyright by including star 
pagination in their CD-ROM versions of judicial opinions. Bender, 158 F.3d at 708. 
222. Charles F. Goldfarb, The Roots of SGML-A Personal Recollection, at http:// 
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True, some specialized systems for these purposes had been 
developed. Lexis (and later Westlaw), for example, had developed 
its own methods of doing exactly that. The Lexis database from 
its earliest days separately identified most of these kinds of 
"parts" in court opinions, and allowed searching within the parts 
individually. But the Lexis system, like other specialized 
systems, was designed for court opinions and other legal 
documents. It would not be possible to use the Lexis system to 
contain, for example, articles from medical literature because 
those articles did not fall naturally into parts called "CITATION" 
or "COURT" or "SUBSEQUENT HISTORY," all of which make 
sense only in the specialized arena of the law. 
When Lexis began adding other types of documents, such as 
news articles, it developed additional specialized search terms 
that made sense in that new context. But again, the terms used, 
such as "BY-LINE," make sense in the context of news, and were 
not easily adapted for searching altogether different documents-
for instance, corporate invoices. 
What IBM's Goldfarb, working with colleagues Ed Mosher 
and Ray Lorie, sought to develop was a more generalized method 
of creating "search terms" for any kind of document or, more 
precisely, for creating the labels that could be used to identify the 
different parts of any kind of document whatsoever.226 And they 
succeeded.221 They created a "mark-up language" that could be 
used to label the parts of any document in any fashion that the 
user of the document chose.228 
The "language" relied on the use of so-called "markup tags" 
or labels that were interspersed throughout a document.229 An 
SGML "tag" consists of a word surrounded by "angle brackets," so 
that a tag for OPINION would be written "<OPINION>,,2JO The 
tags had to come in pairs because they were designed to surround 
the part of a document that they labeled.231 That meant there had 
to be both beginning and ending tags.232 Goldfarb and his 
colleagues settled on a "slash" character to indicate that a 




229. ELECTRONIC TEXT CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, TEl GUIDELINES FOR 
ELECTRONIC TEXT ENCODING AND INTERCHANGE, Part 1, para. 2, at http:// 
etext.Virginia.edulTELhtml (last visited July 21,2001). 




HeinOnline -- 38 Hous. L. Rev. 899 2001-2002
2001] XMLSCHEMAS 899 
Because they had developed a technique that was, by design, 
not specialized to any particular type of document, industry, or 
profession, they named it the "Generalized Mark-up Language" 
or "GML.,,234 Later, after more refinement, this system became 
known as the "Standard Generalized Markup Language," or 
"SGML.,,235 
SGML worked by allowing anyone to determine the parts of 
any document and give them any name, just as Lexis had 
determined that opinions could be divided into ''WRITTENBY'' 
and "COURT" and "OPINION" and similar partS.236 But the 
SGML breakthrough was to allow an SGML author to create a 
separate set of definitions of these names and parts, along with a 
way to indicate their relationship to each other.237 These 
definitions could express, for example, that the ''WRITTENBY'' 
part must always come before the "OPINION" part. Or that an 
"OPINION" part could contain multiple "PARAGRAPH" parts,238 
but not the other way around. 
By formalizing this separate set of definitions, Goldfarb and 
his colleagues enabled programmers to write programs that could 
read a set of SGML definitions first, then go on to read and 
interpret any document with its parts labeled in accordance with 
those definitions.239 The result of this development was that, at 
least in theory, a single document processing program could 
search databases of court opinions, medical articles, news 
art· It' . 240 IC es, or corpora e mVOlces. 
In addition, a "document processing" program need not be 
confined to searching a database. SGML also enabled such a 
program to function as a word processing program in the 
conventional sense. That is, such a program could be instructed 
234. Incidentally, "Generalized Markup Language" or "GML" is also the first initial 
of the founders' last names: Goldfarb, Mosher, and Lorie. [d. 
235. [d. 
236. [d. (explaining that SGML operates independently of the semantics of textual 
elements, and can be tailored to operate with specific applications). 
237. [d. at para. 2.4. 
238. I don't know that Lexis actually formalizes the notion of "paragraphs" or not, 
but they make a good example of one way that an "OPINION" could be subdivided. 
239. See Adrienne Azaria, SGML: A Lifesaver in a Sea of Electronic Documents, 
NETWORK WORLD, Dec. 12, 1994, at 67, LEXIS, News Library, Computers/ Communication 
Archive News file (stating that SGML allows programmers to design programs that can 
identify, manage, and share information in documents that have been defined by 
document type definitions (DTDs». 
240. See id. (noting that, by preserving the content and structure of documents, 
SGML makes it easier and faster for programs to locate information from different 
networks and applications). 
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that ''WRITTENBY'' should be printed in bold face, or that each 
"PARAGRAPH" should be preceded by a blank line.241 
Companies that wanted to make use of SGML to control 
document printing in this way nonetheless had to write their own 
set of formatting instructions.242 In other words, SGML provided 
a way to identify parts of documents, like "TITLE" or 
"FOOTNOTE," but it did not provide any built-in mechanism to 
control the appearance of those parts on paper.243 Companies 
would write their own processing programs to do the latter task, 
and each company that wanted to use SGML in this way wrote 
their own, proprietary set of programs to do SO.244 
By the mid 1980s, word processing programs and SGML 
were more or less complementary but opposite.245 Word 
processing programs provided a way to identify parts of a 
document as "BOLD FACE" or "DOUBLE SPACED.,,246 But they 
provided no built-in way to label parts of a document as 
"OPINION" or "CITATION.,,247 On the other hand, SGML allowed 
an easy identification of document parts as "OPINION" or 
"CITATION," but had no built-in way of labeling those parts to 
appear in "BOLD FACE" or "DOUBLE SPACED.,,248 
Some work was eventually done to develop a merger of those 
two capabilities. The notion was that it ought to be possible to 
create a "style sheet" that would say, for example, that any 
document part labeled "OPINION" should be printed "DOUBLE 
241. See A GENTLE INTRODUCTION TO SGML: WHAT'S SPECIAL ABOUT SGML? ch. 2.1 
(C.M. Sperberg-McQueen & Barnard) (noting that SGML's use of a descriptive markup 
system allows programmers to write programs that apply different processing 
instructions to identifY parts of the word-processing document), available at 
http://www.tei.uic.edulorgs/teilsgmllteip3sg/index.html (last visited July 22, 2001). 
242. See Comp.text.sgml-Frequently Asked Questwns !hereinafter FAQl (noting that 
SGML does not say how a document should be processed for printing), at http:// 
www.pitt.edul-dlsst5l1SGML_FAQ.txt (last visited July 25,2001). 
243. See id. (noting that SGML and DTDs allow programs to structure information 
but do not say how that information can be processed for printing). 
244. See id. (noting that programmers must still write programs that can translate 
the SGML document into a form that is suitable for word processing). 
245. See Ed Tittel, Write It, Format It-Once; Web Publishing Ventures Prompt Three 
Pioneers to Rethink How They Create and Distribute Information, lNFOWORLD, October 9, 
1995, 1995 WL 10830587, at *7 (noting that SGML describes the organization of a 
document whereas word processing programs describe the presentation of the content of 
the document, among other things). 
246. See id. (noting that word processing programs describe how the content of 
documents are presented). 
247. See id. (describing the inability of word processing programs to separate the 
presentation description of a document from the structure and organization of the 
document). 
248. See FAQ, supra note 242, at *2 (noting that SGML assists in the structure and 
organization of a document but does not address how that document should be printed). 
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SPACED," and that any parts labeled "CITATION" should be 
printed in "BOLD FACE.,,249 This work produced a style sheet 
standard known as "DSSSL.,,250 
Despite the enormous potential that SGML and DSSSL 
seemed to offer, the two systems remained highly complex-so 
complex that any work with SGML by itself, let alone with 
SGML and DSSSL combined, required a substantial amount of 
computing power.251 "Substantial computing power" at that time 
meant multi-million dollar main frame or "mini" computers, and 
necessarily meant a significant commitment and investment.252 
Consequently, SGML did not achieve widely popular use, though 
it was widely known.253 When a physicist at CERN in Geneva 
named Tim Berners-Lee began to realize that the Internet could 
be used to read and display documents online, he turned to the 
familiar SGML concepts to develop what became known as the 
"Hypertext Markup Language," or "HTML.,,254 
HTML used a limited form of SGML to mark up online 
documents. Berners-Lee used the SGML method of having "tags" 
or labels surrounded by angle brackets, combined in pairs to form 
opening and closing tags that surrounded a part of a text.255 Thus, 
249. See Mark Walter & Arlene Karsh, SGML Crosses Technology-Adoption Chasm 
into the Bowling Alley, THE SEYBOLD REpORT ON PUBLISHING SYSTEMS, January 29, 1996, 
LEXIS, News Library, Computers/Communication Archive News file, at *4 (noting that 
SGML supplies the structure of the document (i.e., "OPINION" and "CITATION") 
whereas DSSSL--Document Style Semantics and Specification Language-supplies the 
formatting instructions for the document (i.e., "printed in 'DOUBLE SPACED'" and 
"printed in 'BOLD FACE'"». 
250. See id. (noting that DSSSL "represents the generic language for writing style 
sheets and formatting instructions for SGML documents"). 
251. See generally Robert J. Boeri & Martin Hensel, Making the Commitment to 
XML, EMEDIA PROFESSIONAL, March 1, 2000, 2000 WL 17730374, at ':'1 (describing 
SGML as huge (a 300-page specification), complicated, difficult, and uncompromising). 
252. See Richard Blackwell, University's Supercomputer Tackles Many Applications, 
THE FINANCIAL POST (TORONTO), September 7, 1985, LEXIS, News Library, Fin. Post-
Computer and Communication Stories file ':'1, *1 (estimating that in 1985 total expenses 
of a supercomputer at a university were approximately $35--40 million over a five-year 
period). 
253. See Jason Hobby, Emerging Skills XML, COMMUNICATIONS WORLD, January 28, 
2000, 2000 WL 12245709, at "'1 (stating that, although SGML became an international 
standard in the mid 1980s, it was primarily used by large industries such as aircraft 
manufacturers and pharmaceuticals). 
254. See ARBORTEXT, SGML: Getting Started, at 1, 15 (1995) (referring to HTML as 
an application of SGML and the "format of files published on the World Wide Web"), at 
http://www.arbortext.comldataiGettin~Started_ with_SGMUgettin~started_ with_sgml.h 
tml. 
255. See A Small Course on HTML: The Next Generation (stating that, in HTML, a 
"tag" for an element is the name of the element between the "less-than" sign «) and 
"greater-than" sign (», and the contents of the elements (i.e., the text of the paragraph) 
may be found between the starting and ending tags), at http://www.stack.nl! 
-optimusb/courseslhtmI4.0/top_index.html Oast visited July 22, 2001). 
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HTML used "<P>" as an opening tag to indicate the beginning of 
a new paragraph and "<fP>" to indicate the end of that 
paragraph.256 
So an HTML document on the Web might look, in part, like 
this: 
<P>Here is the beginning of a new paragraph .... 
And this is the last sentence in that 
paragraph.<IP> 
In a similar way, other tags were defined for 
headings, tables, lists, and the like. So the various 
headings in a document about the Galaxy might look like 
this: 
<Hl>The Galaxy<IH1> 
<H2>The Solar System<IH2> 
<P> The solar system comprises the sun and the 
planets .... <IP> 
<H2> The Stars<IH2> 
<P> The stars are also a part of our galaxy . 
<IP> 
In this way, HTML became a highly truncated and limited 
form of SGML. It borrowed its tags from similar-looking tags in 
SGML-marked documents, though it offered none of what 
Goldfarb had originally conceived of as the SGML advantages, 
namely the ability of individual users to define their own "tags" 
and provide their own, computer-readable, definitions for them.257 
Instead, Berners-Lee, and later various World Wide Web 
standards bodies,258 provided what definitions there were for each 
HTML tag and left it to those who developed Web browsers to 
implement those definitions.259 Netscape might display a heading 
256. See Betty Harvey, Next-Generation Internet Markup Language, AsSOCIATION 
MANAGEMENT, June 1, 2001, 2001 WL 12765115, at *3 (noting that "<p>" represents a 
"paragraph" in HTML language). 
257. See David C. Churbuck, Document Esperanto, FORBES, June 7, 1993, at 112 
(quoting Charles Goldfarb as saying that GML-later known as SGML when it entered 
the public domain-"changes the paradigm" by making data paramount and allo\ving the 
owner to dictate its form). 
258. See Marc Ferranti, Style Sheets to Ensure HTML Interoperability; Consortium 
Calls for Standard Tags, lNFOWORLD, April 15, 1996, 1996 WL 10011050, at <"1 
(discussing the proposal made by the members of the World Wide Web Consortium, 
including Microsoft Corp., Netscape Communications Corp., America Online Inc., and 
Compuserve Inc., for a common set ofHTML commands). 
259. See Bob Metcalfe, From the Ether: Web Father Berners-Lee Shares Next-
Generation Vision of The Semantic Web, lNFOWORLD, May 24, 1999, 1999 WL 16660885, 
at *2 (noting that HTML has standard tags defined by international organizations for the 
presentation of Web pages while other languages have tags that can be defined by 
anyone). 
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like "<H1> ... <!H1>" in one size and type of font, while Internet 
Explorer might display it differently.260 
By the mid 1990s, many people perceived the need for a 
more sophisticated means of marking up Web pages.261 Among 
other things, HTML only provided for the delivery across the 
Internet of entire Web pages as a unit.262 There was no standard 
way, for example, to have a program like a browser pull in only a 
small part of the information contained on another Web page for 
display.263 One might want to do this to extract the current 
temperature from another Web site's weather page, for example, 
without having to download the entire page. Or one might want 
to extract current exchange rates for a particular foreign 
currency without having to download an entire page from the 
Federal Reserve. Not only is it inefficient to download so much 
text just to obtain a small fraction of it, but more significantly, it 
is very difficult to instruct a computer program as to how it 
should be able to "find" the temperature or currency rate of 
interest located somewhere on a page with lots of other unneeded 
information. Computer programs to do that kind of extraction 
can be, and have been, written and used, but they only work if 
the Web pages of interest remain in exactly the same layout, 
with exactly the same text and wording from day to day. If the 
owner of such a Web page makes any changes to the page that 
contains weather forecasts or currency exchange rates, the other 
program that reads that page has to be rewritten in order to 
"recognize" the newly designed page.264 
260. In fact, HTML browsers have quite a few differences in the way they display 
HTML documents, a fact that has greatly complicated the development of Web pages that 
are intended to be used with any browser and substantially increased the cost of such 
development. See Ferranti, supra note 258, at *2 (noting that competing Web browser 
developers have added extensions to the basic structural tags of their own browsers that 
have led to incompatibilities with other browsers using HTML, and that these differences 
between the tags of various browsers worry Web companies which create Web documents 
because, the more that browsers diverge from one another, "the more difficult it is to 
maintain a Web site that can be read by everyone"). 
261. See PR Newswire Association, Graphic Communications Association Finally! 
'Extensible HTML' for Web Publishing!, PR NEWSWIRE, February 19, 1997, LEXIS, News 
Library, PR Newswire-Computer and Communication Stories file, at '~2 (quoting 
Norman Scharpf, President of the Graphic Communications Association, as saying that 
HTML is too simplistic to support the full function publishing on the Web as the amount 
of online documents continue to grow). 
262. See Rajeev Kasturi, The Tower of XML, INTELLIGENT ENTERPRISE, October 20, 
2000, available through Westlaw at 10/20100 INTELLENTRP ERP34, at *2-3 (discussing 
XML's advantages over HTML). 
263. See id. (implying that, until XML came along, there were no mark-up languages 
that allowed browsers to manipulate data for presenting the data the way the user 
wanted). 
264. See Mark McFadden, Sticking with XML: Tying Disparate Systems Together, 
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It was therefore increasingly apparent to Web researchers 
and standards bodies that life on the Web would be better if the 
different parts of a Web page were identified unambiguously as 
to their content, so that the temperature for Chicago would 
somehow be labeled in a way that a computer program could 
always understand-as "the temperature for Chicago"-and the 
exchange rate for Francs to dollars would similarly be labeled as 
"the exchange rate for Francs to dollars.,,265 If Web pages 
contained content that was carefully marked or labeled in this 
way, other computer programs or browsers could download only 
the information they needed and, even better, could always "find" 
that information on a page regardless of how the page was 
formatted or arranged.266 
This thinking led back to SGML in its original conception: a 
means of defining an unlimited number of markup tags, along 
with a computer-readable set of definitions and restrictions on 
how those tags were used in a given document.267 The SGML 
markup system offered a ready answer to the problem of 
identifying parts of Web pages according to content. The creator 
of a Web page document could create tags for "<CHICAGO-
TEMPERATURE> ... <lCHICAGO-TEMPERATURE>; or for 
"<FRANCS-TO-DOLLARS-RATIO> ... <lFRANCS-TO-DOLLARS-
RATIO>.,,268 As long as the related information were included 
inside such tags, a computer program could always read the tags 
and find the information contained between them.269 Or a 
computer program like a Web browser could ask another 
program running on the originating Web site to select only the 
ENT, February 23, 2000, LEXIS, News Library, Computer News file, at '~1 (noting that 
HTML "tells a browser how to arrange text, graphics, and links on a screen" but does not 
have a mechanism for describing the data being presented; therefore, HTML has no way 
to effectively recognize the data on a Web page unless tags were added). 
265. See Ben Gottesman, Why XML Matters, PC MAGAZINE, October 6, 1998, 1998 
WL 18431544, at ';'1-3 (discussing the need for a language that provides a meaningful and 
flexible way to describe information pertaining to a document and stating that there is a 
need for a meaningful way to describe data because computers must be able to "speak the 
same language" in today's Internet-based society). 
266. Id. at *2 (noting that, "by providing a common language for describing data" on 
the Web, XML allows for more precise searching and makes data navigating much easier 
on the Internet). 
267. Refer to notes 236-39 supra and accompanying te}..i; (discussing SGML's ability 
to allow its users to create the parts of any document, give them any name, and to create 
the definitions of these names and parts). 
268. See id. 
269. Refer to notes 229-32 supra and accompanying text (noting SGML language 
relied on "markup tags," and required a beginning tag and an ending tag that surrounded 
the part of the document that they labeled in order for the tags to be understood). 
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information of interest and send only that part of the information 
back across the Internet.270 
A. XML 
The original specifications for SGML seemed more 
complicated than necessary for these purposes, so computer 
engineer Jon Bosak designed a smaller, but still quite elaborate 
and sophisticated, subset of SGML that could be used in just this 
way to greatly extend the widely used HTML on the Web.271 In 
addition to the familiar "<H1>" and "<P>" and similar tags, a 
Web page designer could add new tags, like "<CHICAGO-
TEMPERATURE>.'0272 The notion that Web page creators could 
extend the use of HTML-like tags in almost any way that they 
chose led to the terminology of an "extensible HTML," or simply 
XML, which brought the components of HTML and XML 
together.273 
XML is thus a reprise of SGML, aided by several additional 
and crucial factors. XML was simpler, just enough so that it was 
significantly easier than SGML to understand and implement in 
computer programs. It came along in the context of the 
extraordinary explosion of World Wide Web technology and 
rendered that technology more useful still by an order of 
magnitude. And it arose at a time when computers themselves 
were vastly more powerful than they had been in the 1970s and 
hence were much better able to perform the complex processing 
necessary to make use of a sophisticated markup language. 
270. See McFadden, supra note 264, at *2 (stating that, by adding tags with the 
related information inside the "<" and ">" signs, browsers could recognize "data 
components of the document" and "make it possible to manipulate or export that data as 
requested by the user"). 
271. See Careers; Happiness is XML-shaped, COMPUTING, June 1, 2000, LEXIS, 
News Library, Computing file, at '~1 (noting that Jon Bosak is credited with the original 
idea of XML and that XML is a "simpler dialect" of SGML that has far exceeded the 
abilities ofHTML). 
272. See Betty Harvey, Next-Generation Internet Markup Language, AsSOCIATION 
MANAGEMENT, June 1, 2001, 2001 WL 12765115, at *3-4 (noting that XML allows 
developers to create the grammar that describes their data and to create specific rules 
used for their own information). 
273. See Kevin Featherly, W3C Lays Groundwork for Device·Independent Web, 
NEWSBYTES, January 27, 2000, 2000 WL 2272462, at ':'1 (stating that XHTML is 
comprised of a mixture of authoring tags from HTML and XML which will allow for more 
flexibility on the Web). XML is thus a step above HTML, a prior deviation from SGML. 
See Terry Moriarty, The Naked Truth: With XML, The Metadata Emperor Still Has No 
Clothes, INTELLIGENT ENTERPRISE, November 10, 2000, available through Westlaw at 
11/10/00 INTELLENTRP 60, at ':'2-3 (noting that XML is an evolution from the HTML 
tag language because XML allows users to define their own tags corresponding to their 
own data). 
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In addition, attention soon turned again to the problem of 
style sheets. If XML were to be widely useful, so would a form of 
style sheets for XML, as DSSSL had been designed for SGML. 
The XML style sheet, though, should take advantage of 
significant advances in computer science and offer the ability not 
only to format with "BOLD FACE" and so on, but also to sort and 
rearrange text, select some text and discard other text, and so on. 
At first, the XML developers incorporated the existing 
SGML method for creating computer-readable definitions for the 
XML tags.274 This method relies on a specialized vocabulary for 
writing tag definitions and specifying the relationships among 
the tags used in a given document.275 The set of such definitions is 
called a "Document Type Definition," or "DTD.,,276 A DTD defining 
the tags for a court case, for example, might specify that there is 
a tag (officially called an "element") that identifies each "CASE," 
and that each such a case must contain tags (or "elements") that 
identify a "CITATION" a "DATE" a ''WRITTENBY'' section and " , 
an "OPINION" section, and that the "OPINION" section can 
contain one or more "PARAGRAPHS." Those tags, like 
"PARAGRAPH," that contain no further tags within them would 
usually consist of just "text." If that were the complete definition, 
the proper DTD write-up would look more or less like this: 
<!ELEMENT CASE = (CITATION, DATE, 
WRITTENBY, OPINION» 
<!ELEMENT CITATION = text> 
<!ELEMENT DATE = date> 
<!ELEMENT WRITTENBY = text> 
<!ELEMENT OPINION = (PARAGRAPH)+> 
<!ELEMENT PARAGRAPH = text>277 
B. Schemas 
Notice that the special symbols and syntax of this Document 
Type Definition are different from the general style and syntax of 
274. See Ahmad Abualsamid, XML: A Metastar is Born, NETWORK COMPUTING, April 
16, 2001, 2001 WL 9806562, at ':'5 (noting that XML used the "long-standing" SGIvlL 
standard for marking up tags known as Document Type Definitions or DTDs). 
275. Refer to note 239 supra and accompanying text (discussing how SGIvlL allowed 
authors to create a set of definitions to describe different parts and names of documents 
and describe their relationships to each other). 
276. See ARBORTEXT, supra note 254 (defining a Document Type Definition 
(DTD) as a "formal definition of the elements, structures, and rules for marking up a 
given type of SGML document). 
277. The "plus sign" is used to mean "must appear at least one time, and may appear 
more times than that." See Moriarty, supra note 273, at ':'3 (stating that the "plus sign" 
after AUTHOR_NAME requires one or more author names). In other words, an opinion 
must have at least one paragraph. 
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HTML or XML tags themselves.278 At some point, those involved 
with XML's development thought that it made more sense to 
express the definition of a complex document with a language 
syntax that derived from XML itself, instead of using the 
completely different syntax represented by Document Type 
Definitions.279 For one thing, using XML syntax for defining XML 
documents had a certain conceptual "elegance" to it, 
notwithstanding that the results are quite verbose in actual 
appearance, as will be seen.280 For another thing, it had the 
distinct advantage that software already written to read XML 
syntax in a document would automatically be able to read the 
syntax of that document's definition-that is, what is now called 
the document's schema.281 
All that was required to do this was to come up with a slight 
variation on the names of the tags used to indicate the contents 
and relationship of the different parts of the XML document.282 
The trick was simply to find some tag that would identify the 
resulting XML file as an "XML Schema Definition," instead of an 
XML document. The tag eventually chosen was simply the 
abbreviation for "XML Schema Definition," or "xsd.,,283 With that 
preliminary tag identifying what followed as the definition of the 
parts of a document, rather than a document itself, it was fairly 
straightforward to round out the basic set of tags that would be 
required. One would need to define various parts of a document, 
which as we have seen in the SGML and XML worlds are called 
"elements."284 So an obvious tag to identify that basic part of a 
document would be "<xsd:element>." And so on. 
278. Refer to text following note 256 supra (giving an eXanlple of what HTM!.. tags 
look like); refer to note 285 infra and accompanying text (giving an eXanlple of what an 
XML document in XML schema format looks like). 
279. Solomon H. Simon, XML Schemas Get the Nod, INTELLIGENT ENTERPRISE, July 
23, 2001, 2001 WL 21117910, at *3 (stating that by using XML Schemas to define complex 
documents, one does not have to learn a completely new syntax to describe one's granlmar 
because the schemas are already based in XML syntax). 
280. Refer to note 285 infra and accompanying text (exemplifying a lengthy XML 
document defined by an XML schema). 
281. See Simon, supra note 279, at *2 (defining "schema" as "the XML construct used 
to represent the data elements, attributes, and their relationships as defined in the data 
model" of an XML document). 
282. Jim Rapoza, A Better Way to Share Information-XML Schema Permits Rich 
Data Descriptions, EWEEK, May 7, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, Computer! 
Communication News, Current file, at *1 (explaining that XSD is a set of shared markup 
vocabularies that provide a way to describe the different parts of an XML document). 
283. Id. (m .. "plaining that the XML Schema Definition (XSD) allows developers to 
build a standard language for schemas). 
284. Refer to notes 276-77 supra and accompanying text (noting that XML 
incorporated the SGM!.. technique that used specialized vocabulary to identifY elements, 
which in turn identified other parts of the document). 
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If we were to take the definition of a "case" just shown above 
in "DTD" format, and convert that to the format of an XML 




<xsd:element name="citation" type="xsd:string"/> 
<xsd:element name="date" type="xsd:date"/> 












It looks wordy (it is wordy), but it works.286 And there you 
have it: XML schemas. 
IV. ARE XML SCHEMAS COPYRIGHTABLE? 
How will tomorrow's courts deal with the issue of a schema's 
copyrightability? How might they deal with it? This section starts 
by quickly suggesting how the analysis might go if future courts 
continue to use the types of analysis that they have used in the 
past. It then concludes by applying to the question the approach 
that this Article recommends instead. 
A schema is designed to be used "with" or "for" something 
else.287 An XML schema enables computers to understand a 
separate collection of data-an XML "database"-and thereby to 
285. Refer to notes 276-77 supra and accompanying text (providing an example of 
what a proper DTD format of an XML document for a court case might look like); notes 
284-87 supra and infra and accompanying text (discussing the role that XSD plays in 
XML schemas and providing an example of what a basic tag in XML schema format would 
look like). 
286. C{. Jaideep Roy & Anupama Ramanujan, XML Schema Language: Taking XML 
to the Next Level, and what that XML document would look like in XML schema format 
(Figure 2) (giving an example of an XML document (Figure 1», at http://ads.computer.org! 
itprolhomepageIMar_aprOllroy/index.htm Oast visited Aug. 2, 2001). 
287. See Simon, supra note 279, at *2 (defining schema as "the XML construct used 
to represent the data elements, attributes, and their relationships as defined in the data 
model" and noting that XML Schemas use XML syntax to specify metadata of a particular 
class of documents). 
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make use of those data.288 In this way, schemas resemble many of 
the examples of other new subject matter that we have seen. The 
use of one work with another can be seen in the input data 
formats of Synercom,289 intended to be used with engineering 
calculation software,290 the operating system of Apple v. 
Franklin/91 intended to be used with application programs,292 the 
game consoles intended to be used with game units in Sony v. 
Connectix,293 and the menu command hierarchy intended to be 
used with spreadsheet software in LotuS.294 
Differences can be identified, to be sure: with present X1v.IL 
technology, a collection of X1v.IL data can be used without an 
accompanying schema.295 The user of such a collection must know 
about the structure of the data to make use of it,296 but that is 
generally the case with collections of data today. The addition of 
a schema adds a new level of usability and importance to data 
collections by opening up many new ways for accessing the 
collection,297 but it is not essential to using such a collection in the 
old ways at the old levels.298 In many of the other cases we have 
examined, the new subject matter was essential for a user to 
make use of some other component-some sort of input data 
288. See Roy & Ramanujan, supra note 286, at *3 (noting that one of the benefits of 
XI\fi.. Schemas are that they model complex information and make it "easier for computers 
to process" that information). 
289. Synercom Tech., Inc. v. Univ. Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 
1978). 
290. See id. at 1006 (noting that Synercom wanted to develop "instructional manuals 
and input formats" that gave design engineers greater access to the engineering 
program). 
291. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983). 
292. ld. at 1245 (noting Franklin's attempt to ensure 100% compatibility between its 
operating systems program and the "application programs created to run on the Apple 
computer"). 
293. Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 
2000) (recognizing that one of the purposes of Connectix's Virtual Game Station, a 
software program, was to allow computer owners to play Sony PlayStation games on their 
computers), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 871 (2000). 
294. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 810 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting 
that Borland copied the "words and structure of Lotus's menu command hierarchy" into 
their own programs so that spreadsheet users who used Lotus 1-2-3 could now use 
Borland's programs without having to learn new commands), affd by an equally divided 
Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996). 
295. See Simon, supra note 279, at *4 (noting that an XI\fi.. document can still be 
used with a DTD or an XI\fi.. schema). 
296. ld. at e.'2 (noting that when a person creates a XI\fi.. documents, he must follows 
either a DTD or XI\fi.. schema format in order to use the data in the document in its 
intended fashion). 
297. ld. at ':'4 (stating that XI\fi.. shemas allow users or developers to modifY, share or 
combine the document with other documents). 
298. ld. (noting that an XI\fi.. document can still be used with a DTD instead of an 
XI\fi.. Schema, but the DTDs do not offer the flexibility offered by XI\fi.. schemas). 
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format had to be created or the engineering analysis software 
would have had nothing to process.299 Some sort of operating 
system program had to be developed for the Apple computer, for 
example, or different application programs could not have been 
executed.30o This more "optional" nature of schemas may suggest 
a greater need for incentives for creation and hence a stronger 
argument for copyrightability. 
On the other hand, it is possible that the range of choices 
open to the designer of a schema is narrower than with some 
other technologies. The Synercom court, for example, calculated 
that about three million different data input formats for 
engineering analysis software were possible,301 and found that in 
fact, at least fifteen different ones were in actual use.302 As 
already noted,303 the district court in the Lotus case similarly 
found that millions of different arrangements of menu command 
hierarchies for spreadsheet software were possible. It seems 
unlikely that the author of an XML schema would have anything 
comparable to that many expressive options, an argument 
cutting against the copyrightability of schemas. 
No doubt other differences could be identified as well. In any 
event, we can start the analysis by imagining this fact pattern, 
extrapolated from current events. A plaintiff organization 
develops a schema to be used for a certain purpose or in a certain 
industry. Use of this schema is licensed, either for free or for a 
fee, but in either event, use is permitted only on certain 
conditions. Perhaps the license authorizes a user to obtain a copy 
of the schema and use it "manually" to design an XML database, 
or perhaps it authorizes a user to refer to the schema 
"mechanically," that is, to verify with a computer that a given 
XML database is structured in accordance with the schema's 
299. Synercom Tech., Inc. v. Univ. Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (N.D. 
Tex. 1978) (noting that the input formats enabled the user to gain easier access to the 
computer engineering programs). 
300. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1245 (3d Cir. 
1983) (noting that the operating system programs needed to be exact in order to run the 
application programs). 
301. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1012 ("By varying only the order constituent of the 
format instruction, the manner of communicating with the computer may be expressed in 
ten factorial (10-9-8-7-6-5-4-3-2-1); that is 3,628,800 expressions."). 
302. The right number might be thirteen or fourteen, but I read the court's statement 
as saying fifteen. See id. at 1007 ("There are hundreds of programs available for 
structural analysis, and at least fifteen are competitive with STRAN. All but EDI and 
Synercom have different input formats.") 
303. Refer to note 122 supra and accompanying text (discussing the district court's 
finding in Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International Inc., 831 F. Supp. 202, 215 
(D. Mass. 1993), that the menu tree in Lotus 1-2-3 could be arranged in many different 
ways because of the different words which could be used for the spreadsheet commands}. 
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definitions. But, in any event, the use of the schema is intended 
to be through some sort of access "gateway" maintained by the 
author of the schema.304 Now suppose that a defendant makes use 
of such a schema in an unauthorized way. Perhaps it obtains a 
copy of the schema and seeks to redistribute it to the public. 
Perhaps it provides a copy of the schema for others to verify or 
validate their own database with reference to the schema. 
Perhaps it provides a service related to the processing of data 
that requires organizations to make reference to the schema as it 
is hosted by the schema's author, but in some way that violates 
the terms of the license. 
Plaintiff schema author now brings a copyright action 
against this defendant. What result? 
A. Dictionary Definition Approach 
We know that some courts use a dictionary definition 
approach to issues of new copyrightable subject matter.305 Such a 
court would analyze the issue under section 102(b),306 asking 
whether a schema is in fact nothing more than a "system," an 
"idea," a "process," or a "method of operation," and so forth.307 The 
conclusion might be that an XML schema is a "system" or 
"process," inasmuch as it is used at times as part of a check on 
the compliance of a set of data with the schema's standard.30B 
Indeed, when a computer checks for that compliance, we might 
characterize the check as a "systematic process," lending force to 
the copyright conclusion that a schema is a "system" or a 
"process" itself and hence not copyrightable.309 The counter 
argument will be that whatever is systematic is the overall 
304. One reason a schema author might want some sort of "gateway" is to extract 
some sort of "toll." That toll might be a direct charge for use, or it might be the collection 
of personal data to produce a mailing list, or it might be something else. 
305. Refer to notes 26-44 supra and accompanying text (discussing the use by 
several different courts of the "dictionary definition" approach to determine whether 
copyright protection should be given to certain subject matter). 
306. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original 
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, 
illustrated, or embodied in such work."). 
307. Refer to notes 54-55 supra and accompanying text (noting that the First Circuit 
in Lotus inquired as to whether the subject matter was a "system" or "method of 
operation" because copyright protection applies to neither). 
308. Refer to notes 287-88 supra and accompanying text (noting that XML schemas 
are designed to be used "with" a program and allow that program to understand and use a 
separate set of data in different XML documents). 
309. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (stating that "in no case does copyright protection ... 
e"i;end to any ... system [or] method of operation"). 
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process: it is a series of steps to be taken.310 One part of those 
steps may include using or reading or processing the schema, but 
the fact that the schema is an instrument or thing used within a 
system or process does not make the schema itself a "system" or 
"process.,,311 
B. Merger Approach 
As has often been true in new technological subject matter 
debates,312 the defendant would point to the mechanical nature of 
schemas-something designed to be processed by computer-as a 
kind of functionality that dictated or merged with any possible 
expressive qualities, robbing them of copyrightability. Baker v. 
Selden313 will of course be cited on this point.314 The fact that it is 
machine readable suggests "functional" and "merger," doesn't it? 
Timing. The designer of a database has a range of choices in 
that design. If a schema is written at that same time, then the 
same wide range of choices is open to the writer of the schema. If 
the database design is taken as a given, and later a schema is 
written, there are still some choices open to the schema author, 
310. Refer to note 311 infra and accompanying text (discussing how something might 
be just a part of a "system" while not being considered a system in and of itself). 
311. See, e.g., American Dental Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass'n, 126 F.3d 977,980-
81 (7th Cir. 1997): 
Id. 
A dictionary cannot be called a "system" just because new novels are written 
using words, all of which appear in the dictionary. Nor is word-processing 
software a "system" just because it has a command structure for producing 
paragraphs. The Code [a taxonomy of dental procedures and the subject matter 
ofthe casel is a taxonomy, which may be put to many uses. These uses may be or 
include systems; the Code is not. 
312. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1251 
(3d Cir. 1983) (discussing Franklin's defense that Apple's operating systems are not 
copyrightable because the operating systems are "'purely utilitarian works' and ... Apple 
is seeking to block the use of the art embodied in its operating systems"); Music Licensing 
and Related Copyright Issues Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property 
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Congo (1997), 1997 WL 11234980, at ':'15 
(prepared statement of Patrick Collins on behalf ofSESAC, Inc.) (discussing the pre-1978 
practice of not giving copyright protection to the underlying musical scores on phonograph 
records); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 813-14 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(discussing Borland's argument that the facts from Baker v. Seldon are identical and, 
therefore, the "user interface" of Lotus 1-2-3 is not copyrightable), aff'd by an equally 
divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996); White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 
1, 11-12 (1908) (stating Apollo's contention that the perforated rolls of music used in 
connection with the mechanical production of music such as by player pianos are not 
subject to copyright protection). 
313. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 106 (1879) (concluding that blank account books 
are not copyrightable, because they are described and illustrated in a different book that 
is copyrightable). 
314. I have long since concluded that an unwritten rule requires Baker v. Selden to 
be cited whenever a copyright case involves new technology. 
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but those choices are much more narrowly circumscribed because 
the schema must reflect the database structure. 
C. Standards and Compatibility Approach 
We know that some courts favor promoting the use of de 
facto standards.315 If our hypothetical schema is widely used, it 
may well become such a standard. Indeed, an argument about 
standards in an XML schema case would likely have more force 
than the same argument in Lotus-type cases. Recall that in the 
Lotus case, the plaintiffs product was produced for individual 
sales. As far as we can tell from the court's opinion, Lotus 1-2-3 
was not expressly promoted or touted as being an industry 
"standard."316 An author of the XML schema might well be 
expressly promoting or touting the schema for just such 
standardization purposes. Industry adoption as a standard is, in 
large part, what gives a schema its value because third parties 
can more easily exchange or access data that is formatted in 
accordance with a commonly-used standard schema.317 
A useful example for thinking about the standards issue 
appears in the schemas that are currently under development for 
use in the legal system.318 Electronic filing of court documents is 
one area in which considerable work has been underway for some 
time.319 A schema for such documents would be of greatest use if 
it were adopted as an official standard by a given jurisdiction, 
and would be of even greater use if adopted by, say, all state 
courts or all federal courts or both.320 Legal schemas, thus 
315. Refer to Part II.A.2 supra (discussing the use by several courts of de facto 
standards or standards of practice as a way of finding certain subject matter not 
copyrightable). 
316. Lotus v. Borland, 49 F.3d 807, 809-810 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that Lotus 1-2-3, 
like many other computer programs, allows users to write "macros," and that by using 
Lotus 1-2-3, users can shorten the time needed to operate certain programs), affd by an 
equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996). 
317. See Rapoza, supra note 282, at *1 (stating that XML schemas, a new standard 
adopted by the World Wide Web Consortium, make it easier for business partners to 
exchange and integrate information). 
318. William Skeels IV, What Can Lawyers Expect as the Internet Matures?, LEGAL 
TECHNOLOGY PRODUCT NEWS, December 2000, available through Westlaw at 12100 LTPN 
128, at ':'3 (discussing a group called LegalXML's work on creating an XML-based 
standard that describes legal documents and other information to help facilitate electronic 
filing in courts). 
319. See Jody Rolnick, Eugene, Ore., Company Seeks to Shift Courts, Lawyers into 
Online Legal Filing, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIBUNE BUSINESS NEWS: THE REGISTER GUARD, 
June 18, 2001, 2001 WL 23527262, at *3 (describing endeavors by numerous companies to 
enter into contracts with different court systems to provide e-filing systems and e-storage 
service for court documents). 
320. Refer to note 317 supra and accompanying text (stating that an industry's 
adoption of a certain schema gives it value because the schema then may become a 
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officially adopted, would then resemble the electrical codes or 
building codes already discussed.321 
A court inclined to give weight to the standards issue would 
be strongly inclined to find that a legal schema, adopted into law 
(perhaps as an administrative rule of a court), would not be 
copyrightable.322 Whatever arguments are persuasive in 
connection with the desire of users to be able to use "standard" 
spreadsheet menu commands, to pick one example, would 
certainly apply a fortiori to a court requirement that attorneys 
must use a particular standard for the filing of documents. 
D. This Article's Approach 
This Article recommends that new subject matter cases be 
analyzed with regard to: (1) whether incentives would make a 
significant difference in the quantity of works of that subject 
matter that are produced and disseminated; (2) whether a range 
of different quality levels is possible for that type of work; and (3) 
whether potential customers of the work would be likely to care 
about those differences. Applied to XML schemas, this approach 
asks: (1) whether the incentive of copyright would likely be 
significant for the creation and dissemination of such schemas; 
(2) whether a range of different quality levels exist for schemas 
(beyond what is good enough to bring an associated product like 
an XML database or document to market); and (3) whether 
consumers would be likely to care about those differences. 
The strongest argument for copyright's incentive to make a 
difference in the quantity ofXML schemas produced is that such 
schemas are not essential to the use of an XML database.323 As 
noted, schemas offer a new level of function and the potential for 
much wider access,324 but they are not essential to the use of a 
database, XML or otherwise.325 Because XML schemas are new in 
commonly-used standard; once a standard, the schema then facilitates communication 
between its users because people in that particular field become familiar with using that 
schema). 
321. Refer to notes 61-62 supra and accompanying text (noting that courts using the 
standards approach will not find a new work copyrightable if it has been adopted as a 
"standard" because it would be unfair to the competition and consumers). 
322. Refer to note 62 supra and accompanying text (explaining that one reason why 
courts use the de facto standards approach is to prevent consumers from having to retain 
or relearn how to use new products). 
323. See Simon, supra note 279, at ':'4 (noting that an XML schema is not necessary 
to use an XML document; a DTD may be an acceptable alternative to a schema). 
324. Refer to notes 282-83 supra and accompanying text (discussing the advantages 
to using XML schemas in an XML database). 
325. See Simon, supra note 279, at *4 (noting that users can also use DTDs to use an 
XML document instead of an XML schema). 
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the past few years,326 databases created and used before that 
time-and there must be hundreds of thousands, if not 
millions327-would not have an XML schema associated with 
them, and yet are, by hypothesis, in productive use already. 
From that perspective, perhaps a strong incentive would be 
needed to bring forth very many schemas at all. 
But that possibility seems unlikely. If XML schemas were 
actually useful, actually provided a greater level of functionality 
than a database without such a schema, one would imagine that 
that functionality alone would bring forth a great many schemas, 
whether copyrightable or not. In that case, perhaps no extra 
copyright incentive would be needed.328 One additional fact would 
be important here, however, and that is the likelihood of public 
disclosure and dissemination. If disclosure or distribution has 
value, then we should care not only about schema creation, but 
about schema disclosure and distribution. It might turn out that 
private organizations have the strong incentive of added 
functionality to develop XML schemas for internal use; but that 
lacking copyright protection, they might choose not to disclose 
such schemas to the public generally, relying instead on trade 
secret law and actual secrecy to prevent circulation or 
disclosure.329 It would be quite possible to use a schema internally 
and not make it known publicly-in that way, XML schemas are 
different from, say, the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface, which must be 
disclosed to the public in order to sell the Lotus 1-2-3 program.330 
326. ld. at ':'1 (noting that XML Schema only recently attained final recommendation 
status from the W3C and are now beginning to gain acceptance from companies). 
327. There are Free Databases on the Web-But Where?, THE INFORMATION ADVISOR, 
June 1, 2001, available at 2001 WL 13572678, at *1 (noting that the Gale Directory of 
Databases provides information on 130,000 public databases but provides information on 
only "a few hundred Internet databases," and is by no means a comprehensive 
compilation of all the databases available on the Internet today). 
328. Refer to note 164 supra and accompanying text (noting that if a certain product 
would have been created ,vith or ,vithout copyright protection, the copyright protection 
does not provide an incentive for creation of that particular product; instead, copyright 
protection does nothing more than prevent competition and keep prices high for 
consumers). 
329. Cf. GREGORY M. WASSON, MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRET UNDER 
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § l(A)(2) (1991), 12 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 711 
(discussing the different views on the purpose of trade secret law, and noting that while 
some believe the purpose of trade secret law is to encourage invention, others believe that 
trade secret law is an attempt to "enforce some degree of commercial morality," and still 
others feel that the purpose of trade secret law is to protect people from another's breach 
of faith and to keep others from taking one's secrets by immoral means). 
330. See Simon, supra 279, at *4 (noting that an XML schema is not necessary to use 
an XML document); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 809 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(stating that a user needs the menu command hierarchy in Lotus 1-2-3 in order to use the 
data and information in the program), affd by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 
(1996). 
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For that matter, every database necessarily has some sort of 
organization and arrangement, which amounts to an informal 
"schema." How many of us in the public are aware of these 
informal "schemas"? Are we aware of the organization and 
structure of the databases that we face daily, from Web site logs 
to credit card accounts to mortgage payment schedules? 
Converting these internal, informal schemas to formal XML 
schemas would not magically bring them to the public's 
attention. Providing them with copyright protection would at 
least permit and even encourage organizations to disclose them 
to the public.331 The application of copyright protection would also 
likely pre-empt trade secret protection and in that way make 
public disclosure more likely as well.332 
Other forces are at work that would provide an incentive to 
the disclosure of many XML schemas besides copyright, however. 
Although such schemas can certainly be used internally by a 
single organization, one of the touted virtues of schemas is that 
they make it much easier for companies to deal electronically 
with each other.333 One likely source of schema development is 
therefore trade associations. An association-developed schema 
could be shared among all member companies precisely for the 
purpose of those companies exchanging data (exchanging current 
inventory data with suppliers to facilitate automatic just-in-time 
delivery by those suppliers, for example). Perhaps trade 
association-developed schemas, shared among many companies, 
would in that way come to the attention of the public. 
Even in this instance, though, it is not obvious that the 
members of a trade association have any incentive to disclose 
such schemas outside the association. Why should a potentially 
valuable XML schema, the development of which was funded by 
dues-paying members, be given away to others who do not 
similarly pay dues? Again, if these schemas have value to the 
public, then extending copyright protection to them might be 
useful to provide an incentive for groups like trade associations 
to let the schemas come to the public's attention.334 
331. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994) (stating that copyright protection prevents the 
reproduction of original works). 
332. Margaret H. Kavalaris, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION BASICS § 
3(C)(1)(a) (1995), 403 PLIIPAT 143, 157 (stating that federal copyright laws still preempt 
state trade secret laws). 
333. See Rapoza, supra note 282, at ':'1 (stating that XML schemas make it easier for 
businesses to exchange and integrate information). 
334. Refer to notes 163-65 supra and accompanying text (postulating that copyright 
law should provide incentives to encourage public disclosure of the creative work and 
discourage companies and businesses from keeping the product to themselves). 
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Finally, in the future, we may see businesses formed on the 
basis of offering a widely accessible database for a fee. Such 
businesses could rely on a publicly-accessible XML schema to 
facilitate the public's access to their databases. Businesses like 
this, unlike those that use schemas only internally or only within 
the members of a trade association or similar group, would 
therefore have an incentive both to create a schema in the first 
place, and also to make it publicly known and available. In this 
latter case, the schema would be much like the menu command 
hierarchy in Lotus-necessarily created, and "good enough," in 
order to be packaged and sold along with the access to the 
underlying database.335 Yet, as might be true with a menu 
command hierarchy, a range of different quality levels might still 
be possible for such a schema, beyond whatever quality level 
proved "good enough" to justify bringing the underlying database 
to market at all. If that were true, then the application of 
copyright would make a difference to that quality level: the more 
easily a developer can capture the benefits of greater investment 
in a schema's quality by protecting it with copyright, the more 
likely the developer is to make that greater investment and to 
produce a schema of that higher quality. 
Would consumers care about the different quality levels? 
One can imagine any result here. Like many readers, I have had 
at least some direct, hands-on experience with menu command 
hierarchies, buying application programs to run on given 
hardware and software platforms, and using game programs and 
consoles. I have not had comparable experience with the use of 
publicly available XML schemas and consequently lack that 
same experiential intuition, so my speculations are even more 
speculative. 
One can envision a world in which XML schema designers 
debate passionately the virtues of using one type of approach to 
schema design over another, or extol the elegance of one 
syntactical formulation over another, and that no one else would 
care a wit about these debates or instances of elegance. If that 
were true, then different quality levels would exist for schemas, 
but they would be of little interest or use to consumers of those 
schemas. In that case, copyright protection would be 
superfluous.336 
335. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 809 (stating that a user would not be able to use Lotus 1-2-3 
without the menu command hierarchy that accompanies the program), affd by an equally 
divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996). 
336. Refer to note 169 supra and accompanying text (noting that if consumers did not 
care about the differences in the quality ofthe various products, then copyright protection 
is irrelevant). 
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One can also envision a market for schemas in which the 
consumers are businesses, universities, or other organizations. It 
might turn out that these consumers are keenly aware that some 
schemas are faster for computers to process than others, some 
are easier to understand by humans as well as computers than 
others, some are easier to combine with different types of 
databases or software than other schemas, some are easier to 
transport to different platforms than others, or in general, that 
XML schemas-even those that describe the same underlying 
database-might vary from each other in qualitatively important 
ways even if individual users were unaware of those ways. If that 
proved true, then the argument for treating XML schemas as 
copyrightable works of authorship would be strong indeed.337 We 
would want schema developers to be able to capture the full 
value of their efforts at greater quality so that they would invest 
at the proper level to achieve that quality. Copyright protection is 
a useful and appropriate way to accomplish just that result.338 
Finally, one can also envision a world in which all the above 
scenarios are true. Schema designers might debate commercially 
unimportant differences, even while they pay great attention to 
other differences that do matter to schema consumers. If any of 
the various possibilities I have sketched out seems intuitively 
likely to me, it is this latter one-that all possibilities are likely! 
In that case, the argument for copyright protection is very 
strong.339 Indeed, if the factual findings supported the conclusion 
that a range of different quality levels is possible for XML 
schemas, and that the relevant consumers of those schemas 
would care about those differences, then the analysis of this 
Article shows that such schemas should very much be 
copyrightable. 
v. CONCLUSION 
In 1976, Congress clarified that copyright's subject matter 
did not comprise tangible objects, but rather the abstract 
category of "works of authorship," without regard to any 
particularly medium of fixation. But Congress did not clarify 
337. Refer to notes 166-68 supra and accompanying text (stating that the existence 
of significant differences between the quality of products is a strong factor in determining 
the strength of an incentive for copyright protection for the superior product). 
338. Refer to notes 166-68 supra and accompanying text (noting that offering 
copyright protection to products beyond the "good enough" level is a way of encouraging 
businesses to produce a product of "higher" quality). 
339. Refer to note 169 supra and accompanying text (discussing three factors which, 
if established, provide a strong argument for copyright protection). 
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what exactly is a "work of authorship" in the first place. 
Consequently (and perhaps inevitably), issues continue to arise 
from time to time about what new forms of expression should or 
should not be considered copyrightable "works of authorship." In 
recent decades this question has arisen regarding computer 
software menu command hierarchies, data input formats on 
"punch cards," computer operating system software, case reporter 
pagination, and in other contexts. 
Courts seem to use very informal analyses in these cases, at 
times asking about the definition of a statutory term without 
regard to any underlying policy; at times asking whether a 
merger of idea and expression has taken place; at other times 
suggesting that essentially antitrust concerns such as the 
avoidance of monopoly or the need to foster competition play an 
important role in making decisions about new subject matter. 
What is surprising in many of these cases is the lack of 
consideration of one of the most fundamental policies of copyright 
law, the establishment of incentives to creation. This Article has 
reviewed several illustrative "new subject matter" cases identify 
the types of analyses used. This Article then proposed a different 
approach to such cases, one more firmly grounded in the notion of 
copyright law as an incentive. Close attention to incentives leads 
to the proposal of a three-factor analysis. This analysis asks 
whether the creation of a copyright right in some new subject 
matter would substantially increase the quantity of the works 
produced; whether a range of varying quality levels for such 
works is possible; and whether consumers of the work would care 
about such qualitative differences. The answers to these 
questions tum largely on factual findings. In regard to any new 
subject matter at issue, if the findings are positive-that is, if the 
application of copyright would increase the quantity of works 
produced; if a range of different quality levels is possible for the 
type of work; and if consumers would likely care about those 
quality differences-then courts should determine that the 
subject matter at issue is copyrightable. 
To anchor this proposed new analysis, this Article has re-
assessed the illustrative cases already discussed in light of the 
new analysis. Many of these previous cases were in fact decided 
"correctly" by the terms of the analysis, but one prominent case, 
the Lotus v. Borland, was not. This Article has tried to 
understand the way that future courts might deal with a 
particular form of new subject matter that has not, at this point 
and to the author's knowledge, actually been litigated but seems 
likely to be litigated in the not-too-distant future: the subject 
matter known as ''XML schemas." It now concludes with an 
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acknowledgment that the issue turns on factual findings, but 
that such findings will very likely show that XML schemas 
should be considered an appropriate subject matter for 
copyright's protection. 
